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ABSTRACT 
The key message for the homeland security enterprise in the 2010 National Security 
Strategy is that homeland security “is not simply about government action alone, but 
rather about the collective strength of the entire country.”  Based, in part, on sheer 
numbers, but mostly on its ability to touch every aspect of every life in every location, the 
American population is simply unmatched by any other resource at our disposal.  
Therefore, the country’s collective strength hinges on the participation of its citizens.  
Unfortunately, however, much of the population perceives homeland security as a 
collective good—that they will receive the same benefits whether they contribute or not.   
After examining the level of importance of individuals to homeland security and 
then assessing their current level of engagement, this thesis evaluates the tendency of 
individuals to remain free riders in the administration of a public good—homeland 
security.  The study concludes that the lack of citizen participation is a collective action 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the importance of the individual citizen to homeland security 
and explores ways in which individuals might be more effectively engaged in the 
execution of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) missions.  DHS has described 
individuals as an integral part of the homeland security “enterprise,” but it remains 
unclear whether the department truly recognizes the potential of individuals to energize 
the enterprise from the bottom up.  Furthermore, it seems DHS overestimates the level of 
individual participation achievable under current policies.  This thesis evaluates the 
tendency of individuals to remain free riders in the administration of a public good—
homeland security—and considers the use of incentives as a tool to increase citizen 
involvement.  The primary question addressed is:  How can incentives be used to engage 
the American citizen in homeland security and thereby energize the homeland security 
enterprise? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
In February 2010, the Department of Homeland Security released the first-ever 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR).  Secretary Napolitano described it as 
“the most comprehensive assessment and analysis of homeland security to date.”1  
Throughout the review, the department emphasized the combined role of “Federal, State, 
local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners—as well as 
individuals, families, and communities” essential to securing the U.S. homeland.2  The 
homeland security “enterprise,” DHS contended, “connotes a broad-based 
 
 
                                                 
1 Janet Napolitano, "Letter from the Secretary," in Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A 
Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, ed. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), iv. 
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic 
Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 12. 
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community with a common interest in the safety and well-being of America and 
American society.”3  While the entire enterprise may share such interests, it seems that 
the average citizen is not committed to pursuing them. 
The QHSR’s major focus for individual participation, in accordance with the 
Obama administration’s guidance, is within the core mission of resilience to disasters:  
“Our goal is to ensure a more resilient Nation—one in which individuals, communities, 
and our economy can adapt to changing conditions as well as withstand and rapidly 
recover from disruption due to emergencies.”4  In 2007, DHS published the goal of 
having 72 to 80 percent of individual Americans meet department-defined emergency 
preparedness criteria.5  Recent surveys, however, have suggested that somewhere 
between one-third and one-half of the American population has met those criteria.6  If 
Hurricane Katrina is any indication, an unprepared public can prove costly.  Nonetheless, 
despite the apparent national lessons from this disaster almost five years ago, we still 
observe a pervasive lack of personal concern among Americans, who continue to 
manifest this attitude in such behavior as building new homes in disaster-prone areas and 
deciding to remain ignorant of recommended emergency preparedness measures.7 
Whether spawned from complacency, ignorance, or shirking, lack of citizen 
involvement poses a great risk to homeland security.  With limited resources in a 
recessed economy, the homeland security enterprise must make efficient use of all 
resources available.  Among those available are over three hundred million citizens.  For 
the sake of national security, citizens’ responsibilities arguably extend beyond paying 
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 12. 
4 U.S. President, Proclamation, “National Preparedness Month, 2009, Proclamation 8412,” Federal 
Register 74, no. 175 (September 2009): 46663. 
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List: A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Guidelines (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 57–59, 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/training/tcl.pdf (accessed December 5, 2010). 
6 Annemarie Conroy, "What is Going to Move the Needle on Citizen Preparedness?: Can America 
Create a Culture of Preparedness?" (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 33. 
7 Stephen E. Flynn, The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation, 1st ed. (New York: Random 
House, 2007), 60. 
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taxes, obeying laws, and voting—as Hurricane Katrina illustrated.8  However, without 
mechanisms to spur engagement, history would support that those with “a free ride” will 
continue to enjoy it.  Incentives have proven, in many similar cases, to provide such 
mechanisms.  The homeland security enterprise might expect to continue rowing 
upstream if it does not consider the combined potential of individual citizens and the 
incentives that might encourage their direct engagement.9  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The research question posed raises three important problems for consideration:  
(1) the importance of individuals to homeland security; (2) the underutilization of 
individuals in homeland security; and (3) the use of incentives to engage the collective 
body of individuals. 
The first problem raised is the assertion that individuals are important to 
homeland security.  We know that DHS has said they are, but this thesis intends to 
examine the claim.  On a superficial level, it would seem easy to explain why, in a 
general way, it is important for individuals to be active in homeland security efforts.  
However, the risk of such cursory treatment of the issue, like all security decisions, is 
two-fold.  If we overestimate the importance of individuals, we bear the risk of 
overinvestment of limited resources in spurring their involvement, as well as the security 
vulnerability created by over-reliance on one aspect at the expense of another.  On the 
other hand, if we underestimate the value of individuals to the enterprise, we risk 
underutilizing a vast resource in a security environment and economy where wastefulness 
is unforgiving.  Furthermore, we risk exposing the United States to vulnerabilities that 
reach as far as the American population.  The first two (of five) hypotheses of this thesis 
 
 
                                                 
8 White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2006), 65–66, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina 
-lessons-learned.pdf (accessed May 14, 2010). 
9 Charles J. Wheelan, Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 
2002), 42.  
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are: (1) individuals are not just important to homeland security, but vital; and (2)  DHS 
underestimates this component of the enterprise, both in its overall capacity to affect 
homeland security and in the scope of its use. 
The second overall problem—underutilization of individuals—proceeds from the 
first—their importance.  If, in fact, individuals are proven to be important to homeland 
security, then a corresponding level of individual involvement must be attained to realize 
their benefit.  This thesis examines the level of engagement of American citizens in 
homeland security matters and evaluates whether this level is consistent with the 
importance placed on their engagement.  The third hypothesis is that individuals are 
underutilized as members of the homeland security enterprise.  If this is found to be the 
case, the question that inevitably follows is why?  While perhaps a multitude of reasons 
exist, this thesis examines homeland security as a public good where consumption tends 
to exceed production as the American public pervasively assumes the role of free rider—
consuming all, but contributing little.  Framing the problem in this way allows the use of 
a body of literature dedicated to studying ways to overcome the challenges of “collective 
action.” 
Finally, the problem explicit in the research question is how to incorporate 
incentives in the context of individual involvement in homeland security.  Individual 
incentives have been useful in motivating collective action in the production of many 
other public goods, from environmental conservation to motor vehicle safety.  However, 
there has not been widespread employment of such mechanisms on the individual level in 
homeland security.  The final two hypotheses are:  (4) incentives could prove useful and 
(5) current policies fail to leverage them properly. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Study of the identified problems necessarily starts with the existing literature that 
examines the premise upon which the major research question is built:  the importance of 
individuals to the homeland security enterprise.  It is reasonable to assume that a DHS 
document hailed as “the most comprehensive assessment and analysis of homeland 
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security to date”—the QHSR— would be a credible starting point.10  The long-awaited 
review most certainly was the result of countless hours of thought, years of experience, 
and thousands of inputs.11  Moreover, it is the most recent expression rendered by the 
government of the United States’ overarching homeland security policy.   
The QHSR repeatedly emphasizes the importance of all members of the homeland 
security enterprise:  “the Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and 
private-sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities.”  A variation of 
this phrase is found four times prior to page three of the document.  On the surface, it 
would appear that the department recognizes and is determined to emphasize the 
importance of individuals to the strategy.  However, when one considers that 
“individuals” are mentioned in what amounts to a laundry list of just about every type of 
entity that exists, the statements actually downplay the particular, or relative, importance 
of individuals.  Rather, every possible organization of people—from the individual to the 
entire Federal government—is “important.”  One might even argue that “individuals, 
families, and communities” appear to be an afterthought.  As an individual reading the 
opening of this document, one might feel honored to be mentioned, but hardly inspired to 
do anything. 
However, further reading of the QHSR would reveal that individuals indeed have 
an important, if not pivotal, role within the homeland security enterprise.  Individuals are 
explicitly identified by DHS as essential partners with specific responsibilities in three of 
the five core missions:  (1) preventing terrorism and enhancing security; (2) safeguarding 
and securing cyberspace; and (3) ensuring resilience to disasters.12  Emphasis is largely 
placed on individuals taking certain actions to ensure the security and readiness of 
themselves and their families in the face of all threats—whether a terrorist attack, a cyber 
incident, or a natural disaster.  Such involvement is seen to alleviate the strain on the 
limited number of professional and government resources when needed over a 
widespread area.  DHS clearly acknowledges the importance of specific contributions 
                                                 
10 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, iv. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 19. 
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that individuals need to make.  However, there is little sense that the department 
perceives a greater role for the individual than as one of the cogs in the homeland security 
system—and, then, there is one statement found buried on page sixty-nine of the review:   
The highest calling of the homeland security enterprise is to empower 
Americans to contribute to our country’s security—to embrace a unity of 
purpose. Empowered individuals with a mindset of shared responsibility 
are uniquely capable of disrupting threats and ensuring the security of the 
interdependent systems that make up society.  Individuals and 
communities are the focal point of societal resilience, enhancing public 
preparedness and thus diminishing the effectiveness of terrorist attacks.13 
This statement conveys the foundational importance of the individual to the entire 
enterprise.  Empowering individuals is considered “the highest calling” and yet, 
ironically, the idea is mentioned just once, obscured in the middle of a paragraph 
describing the sixth of eighteen objectives devised to meet the overall aim of “maturing 
and strengthening the homeland security enterprise.”14  Just prior to the passage, the 
QHSR describes the American people as holding “a strong sense of community, a belief 
in collective responsibility, and a willingness to do what is required of them to contribute 
to our common security and sustain our way of life.”15  The discussion leads one to 
conclude that the only thing that would prevent Americans from being more engaged 
would be if they were not empowered to do so. 
Other homeland security specialists would agree with the notion that individuals 
are of critical importance to homeland security efforts, but argue that, despite its 
acknowledgment of this vital resource, the government has failed to capitalize on it.  
Stephen Flynn, former adviser on homeland security for the U.S. Commission on 
National Security (Hart-Rudman Commission), considers the American people to be “the 
greatest untapped asset” in the face of disasters.16  In the aftermath of 9/11 and the 
failures of Hurricane Katrina, he suggests shortsightedness on the part of federal 
leadership in failing to draw on the public’s patriotism, sense of duty, and 
                                                 
13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 69. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Flynn, Edge of Disaster, 171. 
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resourcefulness.17  Robert Bach and David Kaufman agree that individual engagement 
should be the cornerstone of effective homeland security, but has been treated as a “nice 
thing to do” rather than as a national imperative.18  They assert that “the American public 
has been left out and largely missing in action” due to misunderstanding and mistrust 
between the people and the government.19  Secretary of Homeland Security Janet 
Napolitano recently voiced a similar opinion, claiming that the government has long 
viewed the public as a security liability rather than an asset, and that “a culture of 
responsibility” was needed.20  The consensus among government officials and scholars 
alike seems to be that individuals are underutilized.  The debate is over what to do about 
it. 
After almost nine years since 9/11, the goals of an involved citizenry and a 
security-minded culture continue to elude us.  Bach and Kaufman contend that the 
problems of complacency and denial can be solved through more open communication 
with the public about the risks, inclusion of communities in the decision-making process, 
and additional avenues for people to answer the call to service.21  Flynn argues that these 
things are important, but adds that incentives are also needed to keep the public from 
sliding back into complacency.22  Some research has shown promise in building 
awareness and influencing a homeland security culture through information campaigns 
and education, citing the successes of similar campaigns for drunk driving prevention and 
safety belt education.23  While such campaigns have initially proven quite effective, 
                                                 
17 Flynn, Edge of Disaster, 172. 
18 Robert Bach and David J. Kaufman, "A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security: Advancing 
the Homeland Security Paradigm" (paper, Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security, Monterey, CA, 2009), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA499970&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed May 23, 2010). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Janet Napolitano, "Common Threat, Collective Response: Protecting against Terrorist Attacks in a 
Networked World" (speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, July 29, 2009), 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19929/common_threat_collective_response.html (accessed May 24, 2010). 
21 Bach and Kaufman, Hometown Security, 6–10. 
22 Flynn, Edge of Disaster, 172. 
23 Paula S. Bloom, "Citizen Preparedness Campaign: Information Campaigns Increasing Citizen 
Preparedness to Support Creating a 'Culture of Preparedness'" (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2007), 79–82. 
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desensitization and complacency often hamper long-term results, necessitating additional 
mechanisms, such as enforcement, in the given examples, to achieve sustainability.  It 
seems that, while people may have noble intentions and genuine interests in voluntarily 
contributing to societal goals, it usually takes a sufficient “nudge” to garner widespread 
support—even if that support only requires one to be receptive to new ideas through 
education and training.  The reticent nature of individuals in the context of large group 
interests is best addressed through the literature on collective action. 
Most contemporary collective action work originates, in one form or another, 
from the foundational book, The Logic of Collective Action, written by Mancur Olson in 
1965.  Olson reasoned that rational, self-interested individuals of a large group will not 
voluntarily act in the interests of the group.  The logic behind his argument was simple:  a 
rational individual realizes that his contributions to the group are imperceptible, that the 
difference he can make is infinitesimal.  Furthermore, he argued that even a completely 
selfless individual who is willing to abandon all personal interests will rationally choose 
to allocate his resources elsewhere, so that they would be used to make a noticeable 
difference in someone’s life.24  The logic is especially prevalent in the case of a public 
good that is largely seen as being provided by the government, such as national 
defense—or homeland security. 
Olson defines a public good as any good that, if consumed by one person in the 
group, cannot be withheld from the rest of the group.  Specifically, those who do not pay 
anything for the public good cannot be excluded from sharing in its consumption.  The 
logic of collective action is why no modern state government has ever been able to 
subsist on voluntary contributions by its citizens, despite “the force of patriotism, the 
appeal of national ideology, the bond of a common culture, or the indispensability of law 
and order.”  Therefore, the compulsory device of taxation is employed.25  At the heart of 
collective action theory is the free rider problem.  The member of a group who cannot be 
excluded from the benefits it provides is motivated to enjoy those benefits without 
                                                 
24 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 64. 
25 Ibid., 13–15. 
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contributing, or to free ride, thus diminishing the overall benefit for the group.  Olson’s 
theory is useful for explaining how a group of rational people often creates irrational 
results from the perspective of the group.26 
Elinor Ostrom synthesized a number of such free rider cases in order to examine 
the types of institutions that have evolved to effectively deal with this problem and create 
desirable group outcomes.  In addition to Olson, her study relied on the “tragedy of the 
commons” theory first posited by Garrett Hardin and the “prisoner’s dilemma” model 
attributed to Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher.27  Ostrom specifically considered cases 
where groups were composed of self-interested consumers of “common pool resources,” 
or CPRs, that were threatened by depletion, such as groundwater or fisheries.  She did not 
view public security as fitting the definition of a CPR because its consumption does not 
have a subtractive effect on the resource. In other words, consumption by one does not 
reduce the level of security available for the larger group.28  Rather, she considered 
public security to be a pure public good.  Homeland security, on the other hand, is more 
complex.  As already discussed, individuals themselves are largely considered homeland 
security resources, so free riders do, by definition, subtract from the resources available.  
As an example, we might consider individuals who have decided to remain unprepared to 
deal with disaster as subtracting from the pool of available first-responders when that 
disaster strikes.  Applying Ostrom’s work to our specific homeland security problem is an 
interesting idea for future research. 
One thing the literature makes clear is that overcoming the free rider problem in a 
group as large and diverse as the American population has no single, simple solution.  
This is evident in the myriad theories that have been formed by literally hundreds of top 
economists, political scientists, and sociologists on why the problem exists and possible 
solutions to it.  To even scratch the surface of them would be well beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  Therefore, research is limited to examination of the incentive of the American 
                                                 
26 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 6. 
27 Ibid., 6. 
28 Ibid., 32. 
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citizen to do nothing, rather than engage his or her responsibilities within the homeland 
security enterprise.  This incentive is the essence of the collective action challenge.29  To 
overcome the incentive to free ride, Olson theorized that “only a separate and ‘selective’ 
incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a [very large] group to act in a group-
oriented way.”30  This thesis examines the applicability of Olson’s theory to individual 
engagement in homeland security within the United States.  Thus, Olson forms the 
theoretical foundation from which the major research question is addressed.  Criticisms to 
these theories will form a necessary component of the analysis. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis intends to accomplish three goals:  (1) to assess the level of 
importance of the individual to the homeland security enterprise; (2) to assess whether 
individuals are adequately engaged; and (3) to determine how incentives might be used to 
increase citizen involvement in homeland security.  The methods used were designed 
with these goals in mind, in an effort to ensure a well-founded argument would be 
presented in response to the major research question. 
This thesis attempts to assess the absolute importance of individuals by 
examining a number of homeland security incidents—such as successful and 
unsuccessful terrorist attacks and natural disasters—where individuals played a direct 
role or had the clear potential to do so.  Cases studied include the 9/11 attacks, Hurricane 
Katrina, the Times Square car bomb, the Fort Dix foiled plot, and a mysterious explosion 
in Portland, Oregon, in March 2010, which has come to be known as the “PDX Boom.”  
Sources used will primarily be government-produced and government-sponsored reports 
as well as other expert analyses of the incidents.  Additionally, this thesis attempts to 
characterize the relative importance of individuals to the homeland security enterprise by 
considering the aggregate effect an engaged citizenry might have on the enterprise itself, 
as created through mechanisms such as direct democracy and as explained by theories 
such as public choice.  Promising sources for this purpose include Nancy Robert’s 
                                                 
29 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 42. 
30 Olson, Logic of Collective Action, 50–51.  Emphasis included by the author. 
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anthology, The Age of Direct Citizen Participation, and, in addition to Olson, various 
works by public choice theorists, including Anthony Downs’ classic, An Economic 
Theory of Democracy, and the comprehensive two-volume compilation, The 
Encyclopedia of Public Choice, edited by Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider. 
To assess whether citizens are adequately engaged in homeland security, this 
thesis considers expert opinion as well as the results of recent credible surveys and polls 
conducted to assess the level of citizen awareness of and involvement in homeland 
security activities, such as FEMA’s Personal Preparedness in America: Findings from 
the 2009 Citizen Corps National Survey.   
Finally, the main thrust of research is focused on the question of incentives or 
other mechanisms that might motivate individuals to act.  This thesis will examine a case 
of successful citizen engagement—Israel—and analyze the framework used to overcome 
the free rider problem, ultimately seeking applicability of Olson’s theory and Israel’s case 
to United States homeland security.  Israel is well-known for its citizens’ pervasive 
involvement in security matters.  Primary sources include previous studies—some 
comparative with the United States—of Israeli counterterrorism and preparedness 
policies, such as the ones done by Hasisi, Lehrer, Tucker, and Conroy. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The body of this thesis follows a logical three-part sequence:  (1) an assessment of 
the importance of the individual to homeland security; (2) an assessment of the current 
level of engagement of individuals in homeland security; and (3) reasons why individuals 
choose not to participate, drawing on lessons from Israel in overcoming impediments.  
Following this introduction, the three parts plus a conclusion will form the remaining 
chapters. 
Chapter II will explore the role of the individual within the homeland security 
enterprise.  The relevance of the major research question originates here.  Sections 
include:  (1) the importance as portrayed in the rhetoric of homeland security leaders; (2) 
the importance as assessed from previous homeland security incidents; and (3) the 
potential for the individual to effectively energize the entire homeland security enterprise.  
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Chapter III provides (1) an assessment of current individual engagement in U.S. 
homeland security; (2) an examination of the current approach; and (3) an assessment of 
the flaws in the current approach. 
Chapter IV will examine the reasons why individuals would choose not to fulfill 
their homeland security responsibilities.  Sections include:  (1) the theory of collective 
action, with discussion of public goods and the source of the free rider problem; (2) 
general solutions to the free rider problem observed with individuals in homeland 
security; and (3) an examination of Israel’s framework for dealing with free-rider 
problem as it relates to collective action theory. 
Chapter V will seek to tie the research together and summarize overall 
conclusions reached.  
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II. HOMELAND SECURITY’S MOST VITAL RESOURCE 
Empowered individuals with a mindset of shared responsibility are 
uniquely capable of disrupting threats and ensuring the security of the 
interdependent systems that make up society.  Individuals and 
communities are the focal point of societal resilience, enhancing public 
preparedness and thus diminishing the effectiveness of terrorist tactics.31 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has declared that “the highest 
calling of the homeland security enterprise is to empower Americans to contribute to our 
country’s security.”32  It is a bold claim that deserves consideration and, perhaps, 
validation.  Therefore, this chapter assesses the value of the individual American citizen 
to the production of effective homeland security.  Using a threefold approach, it argues 
that individuals collectively form the nation’s greatest resource in dealing with today’s 
threats.  First, it considers the relevant remarks of national security leaders and homeland 
security experts, including looks at the latest National Security Strategy, recent DHS 
guidance, and the arguments of credible leading experts in the field.  Next, the chapter 
assesses the effectiveness or potential effectiveness of everyday citizens as demonstrated 
in previous homeland security incidents, including the attacks of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, 
and others.  Finally, the chapter examines the population’s latent potential to affect 
homeland security in even greater ways than through the department’s stated mission 
objectives—that is, the individuals’ potential to energize the entire homeland security 
enterprise.33 
A. THE RHETORIC 
The words of homeland security professionals, like the ones that open this 
chapter, suggest that private American citizens form the cornerstone of a secure nation.  
Indeed, with the issue of the 2010 National Security Strategy, we find that the notion of 
                                                 
31 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 69. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 12. The term enterprise will be used frequently throughout this thesis.  It is taken from the 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and, here, refers to “Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, 
nongovernmental, and private-sector partners—as well as individuals, families, and communities” who are 
said to share responsibility for sustaining homeland security capabilities. 
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national security has once again turned a corner in the United States.  We are no longer to 
assume that government agencies have the monopoly on national security-providing 
services.  Among other dramatic changes from previous versions, the latest National 
Security Strategy acknowledged a significant role for the American citizen in ensuring 
the security of the country and its people.  For the first time, the president’s strategy 
called out a direct link between national security and “the strength and resilience” of the 
nation’s citizens, citing a blurring distinction between homeland and national security.34  
More specifically, the strategy indicated that informed and empowered citizens formed 
the greatest counter to radicalized individuals at home, and that equipping such citizens to 
protect themselves was to be a primary emphasis in the effort to ensure the country’s 
preparedness for “the full range of threats and hazards,” including terrorism, natural 
disasters, large-scale cyber attacks, and pandemics.35 
Whether or not it is implementable, the White House’s strategy is easily justified.  
The new emphasis on citizen participation is the culmination of almost a decade of 
learning.  The unprecedented attacks of 9/11 exposed to the entire nation the complex 
threat of international terrorism, revealing an enemy who could prepare for an attack on 
the United States and its citizens from virtually anywhere in the world, even from U.S. 
soil.  The devastation left by Hurricane Katrina illustrated the indispensability of 
individual preparedness.  The Fort Hood shooting made real the threat of homegrown 
radicalization leading to extremist violence.  The failed Times Square bombing attempt 
reaffirmed the importance of individual action.  The list goes on.  The federal 
government, in effect, has acknowledged that it lacks the resources to be everywhere at 
once.  Furthermore, the American people would not want them there. 
Appropriately, DHS has more specifics.  In constructing the enterprise’s “strategic 
framework” in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, the department has identified 
five core missions and one additional focus area.36  To define success in each of these 
areas, DHS has further specified 14 goals and 61 supporting objectives.  When combined 
                                                 
34 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 10. 
35 Ibid., 18–19. 
36 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 3. 
 15
with the guidance in the National Security Strategy, we can identify the following 
objectives—and their overarching goals and missions—in which individuals, or “the 
public,” are clearly intended to play a primary role: 
• Mission 1:  Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security 
• Goal 1.1:  Prevent Terrorist Attacks 
• Stop the spread of violent extremism:  Prevent and deter 
violent extremism and radicalization that contributes to it37 
• Engage communities:  Increase community participation in 
efforts to deter terrorists and other malicious actors and 
mitigate radicalization toward violence38 
• Mission 3:  Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws39 
• Goal 3.1:  Strengthen and Effectively Administer the Immigration 
System 
• Promote lawful immigration:  Clearly communicate to the 
public information on immigration services and procedures 
(50–51) 
• Mission 4:  Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace 
• Goal 4.2:  Promote Cybersecurity Knowledge and Innovation 
• Enhance public awareness:  Ensure that the public 
recognizes Cybersecurity challenges and is empowered to 
address them (54–57) 
• Mission 5:  Ensuring Resilience to Disasters 
• Goal 5.1:  Mitigate Hazards 
• Reduce the vulnerability of individuals and families:  
Improve individual and family capacity to reduce 
vulnerabilities and withstand disasters (59–60) 
• Goal 5.2:  Enhance Preparedness 
• Improve individual, family, and community preparedness:  
Ensure individual, family, and community planning, 
readiness, and capacity-building for disasters (60–61) 
                                                 
37 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 38–39.  Though 
not explicitly called out in this objective, by cross-referencing the National Security Strategy, we know that 
individuals are intended to be one of the primary defenses against domestic radicalization (White House, 
National Security Strategy, 19). 
38 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 38–39.  Hereafter 
sighted in text. 
39 Mission 2, “Securing and Managing Our Borders,” was skipped intentionally as it did not imply 
citizen participation in any of its goals or objectives. 
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• Goal 5.3:  Ensure Effective Emergency Response 
• Provide timely and accurate information to the public:  
Establish and strengthen pathways for clear, reliable, and 
current emergency information, including effective use of 
new media (62–63) 
• Goal 5.4:  Rapidly Recover 
• Ensure continuity of essential services and functions:  
Improve capabilities of families, communities, private-
sector organizations, and all levels of government to sustain 
essential services and functions (63–64) 
• Maturing and Strengthening the Homeland Security Enterprise 
• Enhance Shared Awareness of Risks and Threats 
• Establish a common security mindset:  Promote a common 
understanding of security and threat awareness as a shared 
responsibility (65–69) 
• Build Capable Communities:  Foster communities that have 
information, capabilities, and resources to prevent threats, respond 
to disruptions, and ensure their own well-being (69) 
• Foster Unity of Effort:  Foster a broad national culture of 
cooperation and mutual aid (71) 
DHS intends for the outlined objectives to contribute directly to top-level, 
strategic outcomes.  As such, the objectives themselves do not offer useful instructions 
for individuals wanting to participate.  However, they do convey federal 
acknowledgement that citizens will play a pivotal role if the nation is to fulfill homeland 
security missions, especially where dealing with disasters is concerned.  Between current 
national and homeland security strategies, the U.S. government has made it clear that 
success depends upon direct citizen engagement.   
Although previous strategies have not so directly enlisted the contributions of 
individuals, the rhetoric itself is not new.  In the first official homeland security strategy, 
the Bush administration called for an approach “based on the principles of shared 
responsibility and partnership with the Congress, state and local governments, the private 
sector, and the American people.”40  Tom Ridge, the first Secretary of Homeland 
 
                                                 
40 White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 2002), 2. 
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Security, remarked that it was “critical, absolutely critical, that we reach out to our 
citizens and empower them to play a more direct role.”41  Secretary Ridge’s successors 
have voiced similar views.42   
Though their arguments seem logical, one might expect such sentiments from 
government officials who are simply trying to bolster public support for their programs.  
It could be that officials intend such rhetoric primarily to unify the country in the fight 
against terrorism and other hazards, rather than actually to achieve direct citizen 
participation.  There is plenty of evidence, for example, to suggest that policymakers 
view the public as “either potential attack victims or panicked masses,” rather than as 
partners in countering terrorism.43  Secretary Napolitano, herself, recently acknowledged 
that the government had long “treated the public as a liability to be protected rather than 
an asset in our nation’s collective security.”44  However, there are others, outside of 
government, who are also claiming the importance of individuals to homeland security 
efforts. 
Stephen Flynn is perhaps one of the most outspoken advocates of public 
participation in homeland security.  Before his selection as the president of the Center for 
National Policy, Flynn served ten years as a National Security Studies senior fellow at the 
Council on Foreign Relations.  In direct support of President-elect Obama’s transition 
into office, Flynn also served as the lead policy advisor on homeland security.45  He is a 
frequently cited homeland security expert.  Flynn argues that the United States’ “greatest 
                                                 
41 Tom Ridge, Remarks to the Council for Excellence in Government, Washington, DC, September 
16, 2003, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0129.shtm (accessed November 1, 2010). 
42 Michael Chertoff, remarks at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, June 1, 2006, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0283.shtm (accessed November 1, 2010).  Napolitano, 
“Common Threat, Collective Response.” 
43 Amanda J. Dory, "American Civil Security: The US Public and Homeland Security," The 
Washington Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2003), 38–39, http://www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_dory.pdf 
(accessed October 21, 2010). 
44 Napolitano, “Common Threat, Collective Response.” 
45 Center for National Policy, "Dr. Stephen Flynn, CNP President," The Center for National Policy, 
http://www.centerfornationalpolicy.org/ht/d/Items/cat_id/16640/sortby/date/direction/des/paginateItems/5/ 
paginateItemsPage/1/pid/16477 (accessed November 1, 2010). 
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untapped asset is the American people.”46  He bases his argument on the underlying 
premise that societal and infrastructure resiliency to natural disasters and terrorist attacks 
should be the overriding national policy objective.47  This is in contrast to the DHS 
position that preventing terrorism is the foundation of homeland security.48  Flynn 
describes national resiliency as reducing vulnerabilities and increasing the ability to 
recover quickly from any disaster.49  When one contemplates this concept alongside the 
recognition that ninety percent of Americans are living in locations with medium to high 
risks of natural disaster, it is easy to consider citizens the “ultimate stakeholder[s]” in 
homeland security.50  In the light of highly likely, indiscriminate, yet somewhat 
predictable natural disasters, in addition to the prospect of discriminate, unpredictable 
terrorist attacks, it becomes clear that the government’s reach is severely limited in a 
nation of over 300 million citizens.  Now add immigration, border security, and 
cybersecurity, and we can see why DHS is soliciting partners in ensuring homeland 
security.   
The pervasive rhetoric within the homeland security community is that success 
depends upon citizen participation.  However, we might reasonably expect such 
expressions whether the argument was legitimate or not.  It is hard to imagine, anyway, a 
declaration that citizen engagement is unnecessary or just “nice to have.”  Therefore, it is 
worth examining some of the lessons from past homeland security incidents to help 
validate these predictable claims. 
B. THE FACTS 
Homeland security officials’ call for citizen engagement seems to be consistent 
with the threat environment over the past ten years, but what does experience say?  Are 
 
 
                                                 
46 Flynn, Edge of Disaster, 171. 
47 Ibid., 110. 
48 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 38. 
49 Flynn, Edge of Disaster, xxi. 
50 Ibid., xxi–xxii. 
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individuals that important to homeland security?  What, specifically, can we learn from 
recent attacks and natural disasters?  Here we consider a few of the more notable 
incidents—as well as one or two that are not so notable. 
1. 9/11 
There is no doubt that the attacks of 9/11 have shaped the very policy we consider 
here.  Simply put, before 9/11 there were no “homeland security” policies or department 
in existence.  The event was unprecedented in American history and remains the primary 
driver in official policy almost a decade later.  There is likely no greater documentation 
on any terrorist attack in history, so there is almost certainly something to learn regarding 
the role of individuals in homeland security. 
Although the attacks illustrated that just about every entity involved was 
unprepared for such an extraordinary event, a number of specific acts demonstrated the 
potential of individuals to play a decisive role in responding to disaster.  The most 
notable, of course, was the action taken by the passengers of United Flight 93 to subdue 
or otherwise cause the hijackers to abandon their attack plan and crash the aircraft in an 
empty field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.  What set this flight apart from the other 
three that day was the fact that it took off late enough that its passengers were able to 
learn of the outcome of the previous hijackings before their hijackers were able to follow 
through.  This added information is the only specific preparation they had that enabled 
them to take decisive action.  The 9/11 Commission’s report gives the impression that no 
other currently existing homeland security enterprise entity could have managed what 
Flight 93’s passengers did in the face of the utter chaos of that day to that point.  They 
were individual citizens acting independently and completely unprepared, and they 
undoubtedly saved a great number of lives as well as a national symbol.51 
The efforts of citizens aboard the other three flights were unable to prevent the 
aircraft from reaching their eventual targets, but they were not without effect.  We know 
of multiple flight attendants and individuals aboard each of the flights that took action to 
                                                 
51 Thomas H. Kean and others, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 
10–14, 45. 
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relay specific information to people on the ground about what was going on in their 
aircraft.  Aboard American Flight 11, it is likely that one passenger was stabbed from 
behind when he attempted to stop a hijacker in front of him.  On United Flight 175, there 
is evidence of passengers who considered storming the hijacked cockpit (5–9). 
Although none of these efforts would seem to have a direct impact on these 
particular flights, they were essential to reconstructing the attacks afterward.  It is also 
reasonable to believe that if these passengers had been armed with the knowledge that 
this kind of attack was plausible—like the passengers on United Flight 93—the outcome 
may have been different.  To date, there have been no noticeable efforts by the federal 
government to teach civilian passengers how to respond to such scenarios if they were to 
reoccur.  Judging by the well-publicized measures often altered by the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) and the focus on intelligence and customs policies, it 
seems that DHS has focused almost exclusively on prevention in this area.  Any reactive 
capabilities apparently have been vested in air marshals, flight crew training, cockpit 
defenses, air traffic control, and combat aircraft response, but not in individual citizens.  
The Christmas Day (2009) bombing attempt suggests that placing some level of 
confidence in airline passengers is warranted and, in some cases, may prove more 
effective than prevention efforts—even against an inept attacker. 
In New York, the scene on the ground is one that has been immortalized.  The 
acts of heroism and selflessness performed by first responders will forever be recognized 
as symbolic of national resiliency and American pride.  The New York City Fire 
Department (FDNY) and the New York City Police Department (NYPD), for example, 
will long be remembered as heroes of 9/11.  However, they were not the first ones on the 
scene.  As the 9/11 Commission puts it, the “first” first responders were the people who 
were present when the attacks occurred:  the employers and employees occupying the 
buildings (317).  Given that the private sector owns and operates approximately 85 
percent of the country’s critical infrastructure, this is the case for nearly every disaster.   
The commission’s research revealed that individual responses at the World Trade 
Center (WTC) varied.  Some individuals evacuated immediately, some stayed put 
awaiting direction or assistance, some lingered to gather personal belongings or even to 
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continue working, and some took the initiative to go help others (287).  Many of the 
individuals who did ultimately evacuate were reportedly confused by deviations in 
stairwells through transfer hallways and smoke doors that were perceived to be dead 
ends—features that perhaps should have been familiar based on evacuation drills (287–
294).  The commission ultimately concluded that many of the individuals at the World 
Trade Center on September 11, 2001, had not taken preparedness seriously (318).   
While the response at the Pentagon was by no means flawless, it has generally 
been regarded as a great deal more efficient than that at the WTC.  The commission’s 
report identified a number of reasons for this, not the least of which was the vast 
difference in scale and complexity between the tasks.  The primary lessons drawn from 
the crash at the Pentagon regarded command, control, and communication between 
multiple organizations and were lessons common to the response in New York.  The 
commission did not cite individual preparedness or individual action as contributing to or 
detracting from the efficiency of the response at the Pentagon (311–315). 
The conclusions we can draw from 9/11 are that, while it could never have been 
expected to prevent the attacks from occurring, individual involvement did save lives, 
and that greater involvement, through individual preparedness, might have saved more.  
The 9/11 Commission summarized, “One clear lesson of September 11 is that individual 
citizens need to take responsibility for maximizing the probability that they will survive, 
should disaster strike” and “the lesson of 9/11 for civilians and first responders can be 
stated simply:  in the new age of terror, they—we—are the primary targets.”52  In that 
sense, they—we—are also the first line of defense. 
2. Hurricane Katrina 
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Louisiana coast.  
Though it had weakened to a Category 3, it would prove to be the most destructive 
natural disaster in U.S. history.  At $96 billion, the damage was triple that of Hurricane 
Andrew in 1992.  Katrina surpassed the damage caused by the Chicago Fire of 1871 and 
the San Francisco Earthquake and Fire of 1906.  The greatest loss was due to the eighty 
                                                 
52 Kean et al., 9/11 Commission Report, 318, 323.  Emphasis added. 
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percent flooding of New Orleans, but the devastation extended into Mississippi as well.  
There were 1,330 lives lost.  Over one million people were evacuated.  While there were 
scores of heroic actions performed by courageous and competent responders, the overall 
ability of local, state, and federal authorities to organize and react was seen as a dramatic 
failure.  As a result, President Bush directed a comprehensive review of the federal 
response in order to prevent such failures in the future.53 
In accordance with the President’s order, the White House staff produced The 
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned in February 2006.  The report 
identified dozens of lessons learned and from them developed 125 recommendations.  It 
called for “transformational change” to national preparedness and identified two 
immediate priorities.  The second of those was thought to be “the most profound and 
enduring:  the creation of a Culture of Preparedness” (78).  The report emphasized 
individual and community preparedness as one of the most effective aspects of such a 
culture: 
If every family maintained the resources to live in their homes without 
electricity and running water for three days, we could allocate more 
Federal, State, and local response resources to saving lives.  Similarly, if 
every family developed their own emergency preparedness plan, they 
almost certainly would reduce the demand for outside emergency 
resources. (80) 
Although these statements are so obvious that they are inarguable, it is not readily 
apparent how such lessons were drawn from the experience of Hurricane Katrina, in 
particular.  In the first place, affected families would find their homes uninhabitable due 
to flooding within hours of hurricane landfall—or, in many other cases, would find their 
homes … gone.  By the morning after landfall, over 80 percent of New Orleans was 
underwater at depths of up to 20 feet (34–36).  In the ensuing days of recovery, the U.S. 
Coast Guard alone would rescue approximately 33,000 stranded citizens, most trapped on 
their roofs and in their attics (38).  Though individual emergency kits may have been 
helpful, it seems they would have done little to alleviate the strain on responders in this 
case.  Across much of Mississippi’s coast, houses—in fact, entire towns—were swept off 
                                                 
53 White House, Hurricane Katrina, 5–9. 
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their foundations, leaving no standing structures behind (33–34).  For those directly 
impacted by the storm, the enormity of Hurricane Katrina’s destructive power seems to 
have negated many of the benefits that might otherwise have been realized with 72-hour 
individual home emergency kits.  Evacuation was the best hope for those individuals and 
families who had homes anywhere near the hurricane’s path.   
While it is not immediately clear what importance emergency kits would have had 
in Katrina, we do know of many individuals who were in harm’s way and then seemed to 
trickle into downtown New Orleans over the few days following landfall (38–39).  Most 
of them were subsequently evacuated from the Superdome or the Convention Center.  
Some of them likely arrived after being rescued, but it is reasonable to believe that others 
survived the hurricane and then found their way downtown on their own.  Whatever 
supplies these people had on hand when the storm hit may have made the difference, 
allowing them to reach evacuation departure points days after the storm had passed, 
without the help of rescue services.  It is also possible, and just as likely, that these people 
had received supplies from any of the several supply delivery missions performed by 
government agencies (43).  Either way, the thousands of “late arrivers” to downtown 
New Orleans would have added a significant contribution to the response effort if they, in 
fact, did have their own emergency supplies prepared beforehand.  Regardless, the 
eventual disposition of almost all New Orleans residents was evacuation, whether before 
or after hurricane landfall. 
Family emergency preparedness plans no doubt proved indispensible for those 
who were able to evacuate before the storm hit.  Those with specific, well-thought-out 
emergency plans would likely have been able to depart much more quickly than those 
without.  Either way, by Sunday night, before the early Monday morning landfall, 
officials estimated that 1.2 million residents, or 92 percent of the population, had 
evacuated New Orleans (29).  If these figures were accurate, this meant that over 100,000 
residents would stay put as the hurricane passed through.  However, this should have 
come as no surprise.  Prior to Katrina, hurricane plans had estimated that about the same 
number of residents were without automobiles (26).  Lack of personal transportation 
would severely limit the efficacy of an individual emergency preparedness plan, 
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especially with 100,000 neighboring residents in the same predicament.  Ultimately, the 
federal government would use over 1,100 buses to evacuate tens of thousands from dire 
conditions at the Superdome and the Civic Center in the days following the storm’s 
passage (39).  The recovery of civilians from areas devastated by the hurricane was an 
enormous challenge, but would have been insurmountable had over one million residents 
lacked the ability or the initiative to get out of harm’s way ahead of time. 
While the Hurricane Katrina disaster would provide great impetus for renewing 
personal preparedness commitments, the value of personal preparedness in this case 
would be overcome by the scope of the devastation and the shortcomings of federal, state, 
and local organizations in dealing with it.  Those who had prepared were likely thankful 
that they had, but it is also likely that even a “culture” of individual preparedness would 
have had only a minor impact in the face of such destruction, and such failures. 
One lesson we can derive directly from Hurricane Katrina is the value of civilian 
volunteers in disaster recovery efforts.  For example, the Citizen Corps, which developed 
out of post-9/11 policy implementation, gathered over 50,000 volunteers to provide direct 
support to the American Red Cross in administering assistance to refugees who had 
evacuated to the Houston, Texas, area (80).  Their service was essential to the 25,000 
evacuees, in particular, who took up residence in the Astrodome while awaiting recovery 
of New Orleans, or a new start somewhere else.  While the relative value of individual 
preparedness in coping with Hurricane Katrina is debatable, the value of citizen 
participation is not. 
3. Foiled Plots 
While the work that has been done to capture the lessons from 9/11 and Hurricane 
Katrina is voluminous, there is an emerging literature on lesser-known homeland security 
incidents, ones that did not result in widespread death and destruction:  unsuccessful 
terrorist plots.  Often these incidents go practically unnoticed by mainstream media.  
They fail to attract a great deal of attention because they were unsuccessful.  The failed 
Christmas Day and Times Square bombing attempts received brief publicity in large part 
because they provided opportunities to point fingers at the federal government for letting 
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would-be terrorists get that far.  In each of these two cases, the failures of the attackers 
have been credited to a combination of their own ineptitude and the fortunate “late saves” 
of private citizens.  However, greater analysis of failed attacks would indicate that private 
citizens are due at least as much credit for failed terrorist plots as intelligence, federal law 
enforcement, and state and local law enforcement. 
In one recent study, researchers identified 86 planned terrorist attacks that were 
“intended to cause casualties or destroy critical infrastructure” in the United States 
between 1999 and 2009.54  Of these, 68 plots (80 percent) were foiled prior being 
executed.  Of the foiled plots, voluntary public reporting provided the initial clues for 
almost 30 percent (20 cases).  By comparison, federal law enforcement was the source 
responsible for the initial information in 20 cases, state and local law enforcement in 15 
cases (22 percent), and intelligence in just 13 cases (19 percent) as shown in Figure 1.55  
Of course, since all research was conducted using open source material, it might be safe 
to assume that actual intelligence numbers are higher.  Nonetheless, the contributions of 
individual citizens are significant. 
                                                 
54 Kevin Strom and others, Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. 
Terrorist Plots, 1999–2009 (Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2010), 
5–6, https://www.ihssnc.org/portals/0/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf (accessed November 10, 2010). 
55 Ibid., 12. 
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Figure 1.   Source of Initial Clues in Foiled Terrorist Plots, United States, 1999–200956 
The message revealed in the study of failed terrorist attacks is not that complex 
intelligence analysis is critical to detection, but that citizens and law enforcement 
officials are responsible for obtaining the initial clues for most—eighty percent, in fact—
terrorist plots that are brought to light in time to stop them.  Therefore, the widely held 
notion that a successful terrorist attack is due entirely to the failure of the intelligence 
community to analyze available information does not follow.  In the study of perhaps the 
most comprehensive dataset of failed terrorist plots within the last 25 years—a total of 
169 events plotted against American targets—one researcher concludes, “the 
conventional wisdom about why intelligence fails—because analysts and agencies are 
unable to ‘connect the dots’—is wrong.”57  Rather, “plots are [more typically] disrupted 
as a result of tips from the public, informants inside home-grown cells, and long-term 
surveillance of suspects.”58   
                                                 
56 After Strom et al., Building on Clues, 12. 
57 Erik J. Dahl, "The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist 
Attacks Against the U.S.” (Technical Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2010), 1. 
58 Ibid., 26. 
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a. Times Square 
The Times Square car bomb is an example of a terrorist plot that was first 
discovered by private citizens.  In this case, a couple of street vendors observed smoke, 
popping sounds, and sparks coming from an illegally parked Nissan Pathfinder and then 
reported it to the NYPD.59  While the actions of these individuals were important and 
certainly commendable, the Times Square incident does not build a strong case for the 
importance of individuals to counterterrorism efforts.  This plot was discovered in the 
execution phase and, had the attacker been a more competent bomb maker, the first clues 
might not have been smoke and sparks, but a high-order detonation.  The Times Square 
plot was effectively foiled by the would-be terrorist himself.  Americans should consider 
themselves lucky, in this case.  However, this case has not been typical of foiled plots, as 
the aforementioned research attests.  The following section examines a more instructive 
case. 
b. Fort Dix 
In January 2006, a Circuit City employee tipped off authorities to a group 
of six “Islamic militants” who would ultimately be arrested and charged with planning to 
attack and kill as many soldiers as they could at Fort Dix, New Jersey.  The group of 
men, who had trained together for such a plot, brought an 8mm videotape of their 
activities to Circuit City to be copied to a DVD.  The employee responsible for making 
the copy was disturbed by what he watched on the video, which showed the men firing 
automatic weapons and chanting.  The next day he reported the video to local police, who 
then sent copies to the FBI.  What ensued was a lengthy investigation, which included 
close surveillance and the use of planted informants, ultimately leading to the conviction 
of all six members in December 2008.  Four of them received life sentences for 
conspiracy to kill military personnel.  This foiled plot serves as a tremendous example of 
 
 
                                                 
59 Corey Kilgannon and Michael S. Schmidt, "Vendors Who Alerted Police Called Heroes," The New 
York Times, May 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/nyregion/03vendor.html (accessed 
November 11, 2010). 
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the unique potential of everyday citizens to have a decisive impact in terrorism 
prevention.  The Fort Dix case is considered in many ways to be typical of foiled plot 
cases seen in recent years.60 
4. PDX Boom 
On March 28, 2010, at around 8 p.m., an explosion rattled buildings in downtown 
Portland, Oregon.  The police received about fifty 911 calls over the incident, promptly 
responded, and yet were unable to locate the source of the disturbance.  When they 
arrived in the vicinity from which the majority of calls came, there were no indications of 
an explosive event:  no burning buildings, no smoke, no victims, and no clues.  Rather, 
many of the clues were to be constructed over the next twelve hours by private citizens 
via electronic social media.  First via Twitter, using the hashtag, “#pdxboom,” then via 
Google Maps, people began to report what they had heard and where they were when 
they heard it.61  Some savvy Google Maps users created a color-coded system that 
displayed the location and relative intensity of the sound.62  When the capacity of Google 
Maps entries was reached, these users found a way to download entries and continue to 
compile the complete picture.  After enough reports came in, a pattern emerged.  In the 
daylight of the next morning, local police were able to use 911 and online citizen inputs 
to locate PVC fragments of an exploded pipe bomb in a nearby riverfront park.63  While 
the event proved harmless, it holds at least three key lessons for homeland security:  (1) 
the currently prescribed means of public reporting are unnecessarily limiting; (2) the 
composite picture created by the collection of many individual inputs of private citizens 
                                                 
60 Dahl, “Plots that Failed,” 20–21. 
61 “PDX” is the three-letter airport identifier for Portland, as “LAX” might be used to refer to Los 
Angeles itself.  “Hashtags” are identifiers that allow posts to be categorized or separated from an enormous 
number of inputs on Twitter. 
62 The last saved version of the resultant map can still be seen at http://maps.google.com/maps/ 
ms?ie=UTF8&hl=en&oe=UTF8&start=400&num=200&msa=0&msid=105810967145978747791 
.000482e8231e3af9d5624&ll=45.468679,122.633514&spn=0.073917,0.16016&z=13.  This map does not 
show every pin that was placed.  One of the lessons learned from the event is that Google Maps was unable 
to keep more than 200 inputs. 
63 Mary Wheat, "Portland Police Investigate Loud Explosion," Portland Police Bureau, City of 
Portland, Oregon, http://www.portlandonline.com/police/pbnotify.cfm?action=ViewContent 
&content_id=1620%20 (accessed April 9, 2010). 
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may sometimes be the best information available; and (3) the potential role for 
individuals in homeland security may be far greater than traditionally perceived. 
Most of the information gained by law enforcement in this incident came by way 
of social networking applications.  The information was unsolicited and yet hundreds of 
Portland residents provided it, indirectly, using technology that they were accustomed to 
using in their personal lives on a daily basis.  Furthermore, private citizens voluntarily 
established an information repository (via Google Maps) and compiled the inputs into a 
coherent, useable, visual tool that was able to aid law enforcement—a tool that was likely 
more immediately useful than the barrage of 911 calls that came in.  This event suggests 
that there are more efficient, more effective, and more interactive ways for officials to 
collaborate with the public than log jamming inputs through overwhelmed 911 call 
centers—especially during large-scale events.  There is already a great deal of attention 
being focused in this area, but the homeland security enterprise has yet to integrate 
existing social networking technologies in any meaningful way.64  Until it does, the 
importance of individuals will remain artificially diminished from what is otherwise 
currently possible. 
The PDX case also illustrates, to some extent, the collective potential of a group 
of citizens reporting on what they have seen or heard, especially in an urban area.  In this 
case, it was the sound of an explosion.  In other cases, it could be coordinated attacks of 
violence across a major city, the specific effects of a natural disaster, or even the 
characteristics of a suspicious individual or object in a public place.  When multiple 
different, but specific, inputs are collected and categorized by location and description, a 
greater, more actionable picture is possible than if inputs are considered one-at-a-time, as 
items in a list.  The gathering of individual inputs to a single composite map proved 
particularly effective in the Portland case, but would not have been possible without the 
                                                 
64 Jody Woodcock, "Leveraging Social Media to Engage the Public in Homeland Security" (master’s 
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individuals who provided the inputs.  Technology speeds the delivery of information 
from individual citizens, enables more individuals to communicate immediately, 
increases the quality of the data communicated, and enables rapid compilation and 
categorization of data, thereby making actionable composite pictures possible.65  
Technology, therefore, has the potential to multiply the collective importance of 
individuals in homeland security.  Nonetheless, the individuals themselves are the 
resource needed, in many cases, to build useful composite pictures for homeland security 
officials. 
Finally, the PDX example hints at something greater for the role of individuals 
than what the current enterprise seems to envision.  The focus for homeland security 
officials trying to engage citizens has been primarily limited to the resilience-building 
aspects of citizens preparing to take care of themselves and their families in disaster 
scenarios.66  “Vigilance” and “awareness” are considered additional roles.  
Overwhelmingly, the expectation has been for individuals to take care of themselves and 
for the rest of the enterprise to take care of everything else.  Certainly, the impact of 
individual preparedness on societal resilience cannot be overstated.  Additionally, 
preparedness is a role that requires a voluntary commitment from individuals that is 
difficult to obtain on any widespread level, as we shall see in the next chapter.  It will 
require continual emphasis for as long as there are hazards present.  However, the PDX 
Boom phenomenon seems to suggest that individuals might be capable of (and interested 
in) a much more interactive role.  The case in Portland highlighted the collective potential 
for voluntary individual actions to be used in a way that the current enterprise is not 
seriously considering. 
                                                 
65 Imagine several individuals able to instantly upload pictures or video of a would-be bomber to a 
well-known “civil security” web application with just a few switch activations on their smart phones.  The 
application would automatically collect, categorize, and locate inputs, display some form of composite 
picture of the situation to dispatchers, and alert the nearest law enforcement officials.  This could occur in 
less than a minute, but would not be possible without the technology, or voluntary participation of citizens.  
Both resources are currently available, but such a system is yet to be implemented.  Note:  “civil security” 
is a term, akin to “civil defense,” that was proposed by homeland security specialist, Amanda Dory, in 2003 
(Dory, “American Civil Security”). 
66 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, A-8. 
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5. Conclusions 
From just a few brief examples, we can draw some key lessons on the roles and 
importance of individuals within homeland security.  First, it is plain that individuals are 
not capable of single-handedly conquering the greatest threats.  Response to large-scale 
attacks and disasters, like 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, requires resources only available 
through federal, state, local, and non-governmental organizations.  Preparedness in these 
cases is important, and will save lives, but preparedness alone will not significantly 
mitigate the blow dealt by the greatest catastrophes—that is, preparedness will not have a 
decisive effect on overall response operations.  However, a capability that saves any 
additional lives, at such a low cost, is an important one.   
Second, while individuals will always be a supplemental resource in dealing with 
large-scale tragedies, their ability to shape the outcome in a major way should never be 
underestimated.  The passengers of United Flight 93 changed the outcome of 9/11 
significantly.  The 50,000 volunteers who assisted Hurricane Katrina evacuees in 
Houston changed the outcome for over 25,000 New Orleans residents.  Many, many more 
volunteers can claim responsibility for speeding the recovery of communities all along 
the Gulf Coast.  They were able to increase societal resilience.  Their contributions were 
vitally important. 
Finally, individuals play a much greater role than simply bracing for the next 
disaster.  Most terrorist plots in the United States fail.  Individuals are responsible for 
providing the first clues to such plots at least one quarter of the time.  Everyday citizens 
are arguably every bit as important to counterterrorism as intelligence, federal, and state 
or local law enforcement.  The Fort Dix plot is a typical example.  Along the same lines, 
individuals can provide a level of detail to the homeland security picture that no other 
resource can match.  When citizens are able and willing to participate in providing 
information to law enforcement officials, their collective potential is greater than any 
other resource we have. 
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Apart from the importance of specific actions that can be taken by individual 
citizens, however, individuals possess an even greater potential to affect the homeland 
security enterprise—one that is generally not recognized or acknowledged by homeland 
security officials.  The effects of preparing emergency kits, reporting suspicious 
activities, practicing safe computing, or volunteering with the fire department are all 
tangible.  These effects can, in many ways, be measured or directly observed.  For 
example, local planners could determine how many additional citizens would need to 
take individual preparedness measures in order to free up ten emergency responders 
during a particular crisis within a given locale.  Experts could estimate the net effect on 
traffic flow if a city was able to realize a 20 percent increase in compliance with specific 
evacuation and shelter-in-place orders following a WMD attack.  These are the effects 
that homeland security officials are striving to achieve—accomplishment of mission 
objectives and specific, measureable goals.  However, the overall impact of pervasive 
individual involvement in homeland security efforts would also have an intangible 
component.  It is this element that might have the greatest influence on homeland 
security—that might effectively energize the entire enterprise. 
C. THE HIDDEN POTENTIAL 
To quantify, in some way, the additive effect of specific individual contributions 
to homeland security would itself demonstrate the great importance of individual citizens, 
but it would not paint the entire picture.  Something else happens when a citizenry 
decides to engage in a particular endeavor.  The result is greater than the sum of 
calculable benefits.  When engaged, citizens no longer just contribute to the prescribed 
solution to a problem; they begin to shape the solution.  With homeland security, there 
exists the potential for involved citizens to invigorate the entire enterprise—to not only 
strengthen it, but to mold it, both directly and indirectly.  The collective potential of U.S. 
citizens is not to just play a role within homeland security, but to own it, and to assume 
responsibility for it in the ways that one would expect of “the ultimate stakeholder.” 
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Citizens have the potential to energize the homeland security enterprise along two 
primary paths:  direct and indirect.  The direct path includes all the overt ways in which 
citizens are able to make direct inputs into homeland security policy.  It is best described 
by the principles of direct citizen participation—the idea of citizens participating directly 
in their government.  The indirect path includes the subtler ways in which citizens are 
able in influence homeland security—as explained namely by public choice theory.  Both 
paths lead individuals toward realizing enterprise-level changes in homeland security. 
1. Direct Citizen Participation 
The great call issued by DHS is to “empower” Americans to contribute to 
homeland security.  However, there are two operative definitions for the word 
“empower” and they have drastically different implications: 
• To enable or permit 
• To give power or authority to; authorize, especially by legal means67 
The first definition describes empowerment as granting permission—such as a 
father letting his son borrow his car.  The car belongs to the father, but the father has 
empowered the son by enabling him to use it.  The son’s power has increased because he 
has been permitted to use the car, but the father maintains ownership of the car and is the 
ultimate authority over the how the car will be used.  The second definition describes 
empowerment as granting authority—such as a father adding his son’s name to the car’s 
title.  The car belongs to both the father and the son, and the son is empowered because 
he shares ownership of the car and has legal authority to decide how the car will be used.  
When the homeland security enterprise provides tools and opportunities for citizens to 
participate in homeland security activities, it is empowering individuals in the first sense 
of the word.  Direct citizen participation, on the other hand, empowers citizens by giving 
them authority to decide, on some level, what those homeland security activities will be. 
 
                                                 
67 Dictionary.com, s.v. “empower,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/empower (accessed 
November 14, 2010). 
 34
Direct citizen participation has been defined as “the process by which members 
of a society (those not holding office or administrative positions in government) share 
power with public officials in making substantive decisions related to the community.”68  
Said another way, it is citizens participating in the “political, technical, and 
administrative decisions” that will affect them.69  Direct citizen participation is then, by 
nature, primarily a local phenomenon.  Yes, citizens often participate in direct democracy 
at the state level through such mechanisms as initiatives and referenda, but here their 
choice of inputs is quite limited.  They can choose to approve a particular bill or to reject 
it.  Once a specific bill is on the ballot, “yes” or “no” are the only direct inputs citizens 
are empowered to make.  However, on the local level, direct citizen participation can be a 
great deal more empowering and easier to implement. 
Consider the federally funded programs starting in the late 1940s that empowered 
citizens through local advisory councils.  The Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 required 
citizen participation in urban renewal and juvenile delinquency projects through public 
hearings and local committees.  The Community Action Program, established in 1964, 
called for “maximum feasible participation” in decision-making by “residents of the areas 
and members of the groups served.”  Head Start and Legal Aid, begun in the 1970s, 
enlisted “local poor people” to develop and administer the programs.  Two features 
defined the great number of citizen participation programs (137) started in the 1970s:  
national-level funding and local-level programming and execution.  Nancy Roberts, who 
has compiled a remarkable anthology on direct citizen participation in the course of her 
own research, described the level of participation in these programs thus, “the locus of 
implementation was in the neighborhood with ordinary citizens exercising varying 
degrees of control depending on the community and its citizens.”  This kind of 
participation allowed local citizens to apply federal dollars and guidelines to programs 
and plans that they formed and executed.70 
                                                 
68 Nancy C. Roberts, "Direct Citizen Participation: Challenges and Dilemmas," in The Age of Direct 
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69 Ibid., 3. 
70 Ibid., 8–9. 
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What makes the effectiveness of direct citizen participation so promising for 
homeland security is the local nature of viable threats.  Due to the diversity of the United 
States, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to domestic security or disaster response.  It 
could be argued that there are a basic set of individual competencies required to mitigate 
“generic” national-level threats, like “terrorism” or “natural disasters,” but more effective 
risk assessment and response measures are achieved when threats are considered from the 
local level first, than when they are approached from the national level and filtered down.  
Local citizens, when included in homeland security decision-making, offer a source of 
information, innovation, as well as collective wisdom that are inaccessible through 
strictly “official” channels.71  This aspect can prove crucial to the efficient allocation and 
utilization of limited resources.  For example, in Riverside, California, the highest risks to 
the community might hypothetically come from the threats of wildfires and earthquakes.  
If this were true, it is likely that many in the community would have already dealt with at 
least one of these.  Certainly, federal, state, and local government resources in the forms 
of expertise, equipment, and funding are important for countering these community-
specific threats.  However, no one knows better the impact that mitigation and response 
policies will have on individual citizens than the citizens of Riverside.  Sound “generic” 
wildfire response measures may not apply perfectly to Riverside due to some peculiarity 
of the city, for example.  Everyday citizens may recognize mismatches that emergency 
management professionals do not, in some cases.  Having the citizens share responsibility 
in creating response plans would generate better plans.  Direct citizen participation would 
also better educate citizens on the reality of the threats—thereby increasing their 
incentive to prepare, and on the tasks of emergency responders—thereby facilitating 
more efficient response operations.72   
From the national-level, lessons learned can be compiled and brought to bear on 
local planning, but the way citizen “buy-in” is achieved is through some amount of 
citizen ownership of the product—in this case, homeland security.  Threat mitigation and 
emergency response are, by nature, local activities.  Due to the vastness and diversity of 
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the United States, these activities necessarily rely on the efforts of local residents, and 
they are made more effective when these individuals participate from the start.  The result 
of direct citizen participation is greater citizen engagement and better homeland security.   
2. The Influence of the Engaged Citizen 
The indirect way in which the individual is able to energize the enterprise is 
through his or her influence on other members of the enterprise.  Specifically, individuals 
actively engaged in homeland security have the unique capability to indirectly influence 
their governments, the private sector, and other individuals.  We will treat each entity in 
turn. 
First, we must establish at least a working definition of an “engaged citizen.”  For 
the purposes of this discussion we will consider individuals to be engaged in homeland 
security when they 
• Prepare for emergencies by 
• Ensuring they understand the threats and hazards where they live, 
and the impact they might have on their families, their homes, their 
workplaces, and their communities 
• Reducing hazards around their homes and workplaces 
• Preparing threat/hazard-appropriate emergency kits and family 
emergency plans 
• Knowing how to receive warnings in the event of an attack or 
natural disaster 
• Knowing how to obtain risk information if or when it is not 
provided by government officials 
• Practicing what to do in an emergency at home and at work 
• Learn how to recognize suspicious individuals and objects, how to 
respond, and how to report them 
• Maintain vigilance and awareness of their surroundings based on known 
threats and hazards 
• Learn and apply sensible personal, property, and cyber security principles 
at home, at work, and while traveling 
• Understand the concept of resiliency and why it is important for them to 
be able to recover quickly after disaster strikes 
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These traits are inarguably ones that homeland security officials and other experts would 
support; many of them are ones we know they are actively trying to achieve throughout 
the population.73  If these characteristics seem overly ambitious, remember that this 
section intends to convey the potential of the individual to affect the enterprise, not the 
likelihood.  That discussion will be saved for a later chapter.  The purpose in listing these 
traits here is not to suggest policy, but to create an image of the type of citizen upon 
which this potential is based, as a frame of reference for the following discussion. 
a. Influence on the Government 
We examined the potential for individuals to influence government policy 
directly by participating in its formulation.  We determined that this kind of participation 
in homeland security would be most practical, but also most effective, at the local level, 
based largely on the local nature of most threats.  However, citizens also have ways to 
shape government policy more indirectly by communicating their preferences.  There are 
two means of doing this:  (1) voting and (2) communicating with government officials 
directly or indirectly.74  To examine the influence of citizens on government policy in 
these ways, we turn to a substantial literature known as public choice theory. 
Public choice theory, in its broadest sense, is the application of the 
methods of economics to the field of politics.75  Duncan Black is widely considered the 
founder of modern public choice theory with his development of the well known “median 
voter theorem” in 1948.76  Anthony Downs expanded on Black’s concept and developed 
a more comprehensive behavioral model to explain the interactions between citizens and 
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government in his classic, An Economic Theory of Democracy.  As most economists, 
Downs based his model on the principle of rationality.77  In this case—that is, in a 
representative democracy—the rational, self-seeking behavior of individuals is the 
determinant of whether citizens will vote (or otherwise try to influence government), how 
they will vote, and whether elected officials will govern according to citizens’ 
preferences.  The model relies on two basic premises: 
• In politics, a citizen’s decisions on (1) whether to engage and (2) how, 
specifically, to engage are determined by which alternatives yield him the 
highest utility, or greatest personal benefit.78 
• When the government (at any level) makes policies, it does so in order to 
please as many voters as possible by matching policies to voter 
preferences.79 
Based on these concepts, Downs’ well-developed model of representative 
democracy reveals that government policies are determined, to a significant extent, by 
citizens’ political decisions, as one might hope.  The decision that has the greatest 
influence on government policy is the citizen’s decision to become politically informed.  
Downs concludes that the “well-informed have a strong influence in determining what 
policy government will follow.”80  Since governments dictate homeland security policy 
on the federal, state, tribal, and local levels, we can conclude, then, that well-informed 
citizens have a “strong influence” on the homeland security enterprise through political 
means. 
Applying Downs’ model to homeland security, we can easily deduce that, 
in order for citizens to influence a government’s homeland security policy, citizens must 
be well informed regarding homeland security matters.  In addition, however, the 
government must be aware of these citizens.  Specifically, the following three things 
must be true: 
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• Citizens must know the specific homeland security policies that affect 
them 
• Governments must know which citizens are affected by these specific 
homeland security policies 
• Governments must know which citizens know they are affected by these 
specific homeland security policies81 
In other words, citizens must be informed not only of the fact that they are personally 
affected by the governments’ policies, but also which policies have the effects.  In 
addition, governments must be aware of these citizens before they will alter policy.   
The ability of the informed citizen to influence homeland security policy hinges, 
then, on two critical individual decisions:  (1) the decision to become well informed—
because it will not happen on its own—and (2) the decision to take some sort of political 
action, either by voting or by communicating with government officials.  Herein lies the 
difficulty, as we shall see in later portions of this thesis.  However, the feasibility of 
having a well-informed citizenry to the extent required to influence homeland security 
policy does not change the conclusion that such a citizenry would have a strong influence 
on the homeland security enterprise.  In the absence of politically informed citizens, 
however, individuals can still exert great influence on the enterprise through non-political 
means. 
b. Influence on the Private Sector 
The government is able to directly influence the private sector through 
regulation and incentives, as a matter of homeland security policy.  However, we said 
before that (politically) well-informed citizens tend to have a strong influence on 
government policy.  It would seem, then, that well-informed citizens engaged in 
homeland security would have an interest in influencing policy that regulates the private 
sector to ensure better security practices, especially where critical infrastructure is 
concerned.  However, when the private sector’s profits are at stake, individuals will have 
a hard time competing for government influence.  This is because companies have a great 
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deal more resources than individuals do.  Large corporations, in particular, can afford to 
devote some of their resources to creating teams of experts in relevant areas of 
government policy.  It is in their best interest to do this because it is the only way they 
can influence policy-makers to adopt policies that protect (or even boost) their profits.  It 
is impossible for an individual to bear the costs required to become informed to the same 
level of detail, let alone bear the costs required to communicate preferences as effectively 
as companies are.  Therefore, the individual has little chance of exerting more influence 
on government policy than the private sector.  Downs highlights a great example of this 
in the way consumers-at-large are generally unable to sway any policy decisions that 
affect them:  “For instance, legislators are notorious for writing tariff laws which favor a 
few producers in each field at the expense of thousands of consumers.”82  The engaged 
individual’s potential to influence the private sector does not reside in the political arena, 
no matter how well informed. 
Apart from politics, however, engaged citizens are able to shape the 
private sector from within.  Their great potential to influence is inherent in the fact that 
the vast majority of Americans make their living as owners or employees of the private 
sector.  When owners and managers are engaged in homeland security in their private 
lives, they are more likely to be proactive in learning the threats and hazards faced by 
their businesses, and the impact implied by those threats and hazards.  More crucially, 
they are more likely to understand the concept and importance of resilience.  Even when 
motivated by nothing more than maximizing profits, it is rational for such business 
leaders to incur costs to defend or mitigate risks to their own infrastructures and resources 
(including people) in order to continue some level of business operations during an attack 
or disaster, or optimize their ability to resume operations afterward.83  This idea is the 
essence of resiliency, a core concept that homeland security officials are striving to foster 
throughout the enterprise.  Furthermore, one can hope that proactive business leaders 
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would also have an appreciation, and at least a secondary concern, for the impact that a 
major interruption in their firms’ operations would have the on the economy at large and 
within their local communities. 
To many, realization of this potential would seem highly improbable.  
Firms are, in fact, naturally motivated by profit and, to the extent that they are in 
competition with other firms, are unlikely to willingly bear such costs.  If they do, and 
their competitors do not, they are forced to raise prices and lose at least some share of the 
market, or they are forced to sacrifice profit, or both.84  To get through this problem 
requires owners and majority shareholders to decide to make this sacrifice, which they 
are unlikely to do, or to cooperate with competitors to ensure that each bears the cost of 
resilience.  Currently, government regulations and incentives make up for where such 
cooperation lacks in protecting critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR).  Often 
government regulations encourage intra-industry cooperation; firms want to develop 
more efficient ways to achieve security objectives and then influence the government to 
curb costly regulation.  The voluntary Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) established by 
the federal government in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan has helped to 
encourage such cooperation in CIKR sectors and, thus realize the potential for individuals 
to strengthen the enterprise in this way.85 
To a lesser extent, all engaged citizens employed by the private sector 
have an ability to invigorate homeland security.  When employees have been proactive in 
preparing for emergencies, their planning enables them to better manage hardships, take 
care of their families, and more quickly recover from attacks or disasters.  This means 
that they are also able get back to work sooner following a major interruption in their 
lives.  This is especially critical, again, for those industries that rely on them to operate 
the country’s critical infrastructures or produce or manage key resources.  Any advantage 
here multiplies the nation’s resilience from major disruptions.  Additional influence 
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engaged citizens have on the private sector is encouraging employers to maintain 
preparedness in the workplace, including taking evacuation and shelter-in-place drills 
seriously.  Many will also have a positive influence on their coworkers. 
c. Influence on Other Citizens 
Perhaps the greatest potential engaged citizens have is the ability to 
influence those around them.  Often we may not realize the effects we have on other 
people, but a number of literatures show that our day-to-day contacts have a remarkable 
effect on our knowledge, our beliefs, and our behaviors.  Borrowing from Downs’ own 
research, we learn that, in politics, people obtain most of the “free information” that they 
use to make decisions from personal contacts.86  In particular, an extensive study into 
how people made their voting decisions prior to an election indicated that personal 
relationships were more influential than mass media.87  For those who were undecided, 
conversations with others ultimately swayed them in most cases.  Personal influence was 
even more important for those who were uninterested—who were not planning to vote, 
but who eventually changed their minds.  Three-fourths of the respondents in the study 
indicated that personal influence as a factor in their decision.  After the election, voters 
who had made some change from their original position indicated that friends or family 
members influenced their final decision more often than those who had made no 
change.88  While this study was limited to the effects of personal influence on voting 
behavior, we might hypothesize that other types of behavior would be particularly 
influenced by personal relationships as well—especially for those who are still “open to 
influence”—the undecided and uninterested.89 
The transfer of information and the influence of personal opinion seem 
logical results of our many interpersonal contacts each day.  However, there are some 
other results that may be a bit more surprising.  In the vast literature on social networks, 
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one area of research has shown strong correlations between individuals’ social contacts 
and particular outcomes in their lives.  For example, in addition to voting, researchers 
have shown social connections to affect smoking habits, alcohol use, happiness, 
depression, sleep loss, employment prospects, group performance, altruism, and even 
weight gain.90  These correlations are even found with up to three degrees of separation.  
One study, for example, showed that if you were a non-smoker, but a friend of your 
friends’ friends was a smoker, then you would be 11 percent more likely to smoke.91  The 
findings in this field clearly suggest the power of “setting an example”—even for people 
who may never meet you!  The related literature of social learning in empirical networks 
has shown that when people are not sure what actions to take, they often turn to their 
personal relationships, especially their “close” ones, to help make their decisions.92  The 
result, shown by way of mathematical theorems, is that beliefs and utilities of individuals 
converge over the long run.93 
The influence of our interpersonal relationships on nearly every aspect of 
our lives is undeniable.  In many ways, it seems like an obvious statement to say that 
people have an effect on each other.  Research, however, suggests that an individual’s 
influence on others may extend beyond what is obvious, to those with whom he or she 
never comes in contact.  At a minimum, the research shows that engaged individuals have 
a tremendous potential to influence those around them, just by the fact that they interact.  
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It would seem that a citizen engaged in homeland security would be especially influential 
for those who are unknowledgeable about what is expected, or still “on the fence” about 
homeland security in general.  If preparedness and vigilance are part of a citizen’s daily 
life, there is reason to believe that similar behaviors and attitudes will “spread” to those 
around him, especially to those closest to him. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The rhetoric of national leaders, homeland security officials, and experts alike 
seems unanimous:  individuals are a critical provider of homeland security.  Individuals 
have now been formally recognized as having responsibilities in both national security 
and homeland security.  However, we would not expect to hear anything to the contrary, 
even if it were true.  The message from our leadership deserves validation.   
If individuals really have an important role in homeland security then past 
incidents should bear it out.  In fact, they do.  Where individuals have failed to prepare, 
we have paid an undeterminable price.  We can safely reason, based on reports, that more 
lives would have been saved on 9/11 and with Hurricane Katrina if more people had 
taken preparedness seriously.  At the same time, the efforts of individuals in these 
tragedies also proved vital.  The passengers on United Flight 93 did what no other 
homeland security entity could have done.  The more than 50,000 volunteers who aided 
recovery from Hurricane Katrina were irreplaceable assets.  Individuals have arguably 
contributed to as many foiled terrorist plots in the United States as any other component 
of the enterprise.  Finally, individuals have shown the potential to involve themselves 
without prompting and provide an aggregate picture that no other agency could 
practically provide—at least not persistently on a national level. 
Despite the critical contributions made to established homeland security missions, 
there exists an even greater potential to affect the entire enterprise.  Through direct 
participation on the local level, individuals have potential to create better policies.  
Indirectly, through the mechanisms of representative democracy, informed citizens are 
also able to shape policy through their influence on the government.  All working 
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Americans have the potential to influence the private sector, if engaged in homeland 
security.  Perhaps an individual’s greatest influence, however, is on other individuals 
with whom he interacts on a daily basis, especially those closest to him. 
Whether individuals are the greatest homeland security resource is, admittedly, 
arguable.  This chapter contends that they are—or at least have the potential to be.  
However, even for those who would disagree with their placement in the hierarchy of 
important resources, the significance of the American citizen’s intended role, as outlined 
by the Department of Homeland Security, is undeniable. 
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III. HOMELAND SECURITY’S MOST LATENT RESOURCE 
One crushing fact beleaguers nearly every national endeavor:  there are not 
enough resources to dominate the objective.  Faced with the enormity and complexity of 
protecting a sizable and diverse nation of over 300 million from all hazards, to say that 
the homeland security enterprise is plagued by limited resources would be an 
understatement.  It certainly cannot afford to waste what resources it has. 
The enterprise must therefore take stock of how efficiently it uses resources.  
Since individuals are arguably its greatest resource available, this chapter assesses their 
level of engagement.  The findings are not good.  If citizens truly are homeland security’s 
greatest resource, then they are also its greatest waste.  Officials seem to be aware of this, 
though, and over the last seven years have taken major steps to correct the deficiency, 
namely through information awareness campaigns.  Still “the needle” has not 
significantly moved.94  After laying out the enterprise’s current approach to getting 
Americans engaged, this chapter will argue that awareness is not enough—that the 
enterprise is overlooking a fundamental reason for citizen nonparticipation, for the 
latency of homeland security’s greatest resource. 
A. THE PROBLEM 
1. The Call That Never Came 
If ever there was a time that Americans would be expected to engage in protecting 
the homeland, it should have been immediately following the horrific attacks of 9/11.  
The events of that day were felt in every corner of American society, and even in many 
parts of the world.  As expected when faced with an outside threat, the 9/11 attacks 
resulted in “immediate, visibly evident increases in expressions of national identification 
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and unity throughout the United States.”95  It was a time of intense patriotism that 
seemed ripe for an American “call to action.”  However, some would argue that “the call 
never came.”96 
In President Bush’s address on September 21, 2001, he claimed, “Americans are 
asking, ‘What is expected of us?’”97  In short, his answer was to “live your lives and hug 
your children … be calm and resolute.”  The President also asked the American people to 
uphold American values, “to support the victims” of 9/11, to cooperate and be patient 
with “the delays and inconveniences that may accompany tighter security,” and to keep 
faith in the economy.  Most would argue that Americans did all that their leader asked, 
even if begrudgingly yielding to TSA officials on the way to their destinations.  Just as 
the President had hoped, it seemed in many ways, life in America would “return almost 
to normal.”98  Americans would go back their routines, making adjustments as necessary, 
and their national unity and patriotism were largely spent on angry resolve to defeat al 
Qaeda, support of the U.S. Armed Forces, and an otherwise passive display of “not 
bowing down” to the fear of terrorism by continuing to live normal lives.  Homeland 
security—the current concept then in its infancy—may have missed its “golden” 
opportunity. 
2. Our Invincible Complacency 
Then came Hurricane Katrina.  If the United States missed an opportunity 
following 9/11, then the widespread devastation and impact of this tragedy would 
certainly rouse Americans to take personal responsibility in preparing for the worst.  
Post-Katrina surveys of the American public, however, would show otherwise.  One 
study, conducted at the request of the Council for Excellence in Government and the 
American Red Cross, analyzed two samples of data:  one collected in the days 
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immediately surrounding the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, but before the level of 
destruction was widely known; the other collected two months later.  The analysis of 
these data yielded this remarkable conclusion:  
Throughout the history of this nation, Americans have learned from and 
modified or changed their behavior following disasters, both in response 
to a disaster and in their preparedness for what may lie ahead.  Both 
personally and as a nation, we have always mobilized to respond.  Given 
this shared history, the most remarkable finding to emerge from this study 
is that Americans’ response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita—indeed even 
to September 11, 2001—is nearly nonexistent in terms of their personal 
preparedness for disaster.  The lessons the public learned from these most 
recent disasters appear to be extremely limited.99 
Another study, also conducted two months after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf 
Coast, revealed that only 22 percent of Americans felt they were prepared for a terrorist 
attack and 31 percent felt prepared for a natural disaster (Figure 2).100  Aside from not 
feeling prepared, the more objective data in the survey revealed that Americans were not 
prepared.  Forty-three percent of Americans reported having an emergency plan, 46 
percent had an emergency kit, and only 17 percent had both a complete emergency plan 
and a complete emergency kit.101  Over half of Americans said they intended to rely 
heavily on local emergency responders in case of disaster.  Almost one-third expected to 
rely on state and federal agencies.102  Just under two-thirds of working Americans 
reported being familiar with emergency plans at their workplace.  Less than half of 
parents were familiar with the emergency plan for their children’s school.  Even fewer 
Americans had knowledge of their community or state emergency plans.  Of those 
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Americans who did have appropriate information on what to do in an emergency, just 
half indicated that they or someone in their family had participated in an emergency drill 
at school, at work, or in the community.103 
Figure 2.   Perceived Preparedness104 
Clearly, Americans, at that time at least, were predominantly unprepared to deal 
with crises such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters.  What is more telling about the 
challenge of garnering citizen support, however, is that most underprepared Americans 
did not intend to do anything about it.  Even after seeing the devastation of Katrina, the 
percentage of Americans who admitted doing absolutely nothing to prepare for disasters 
had only decreased from 42 to 36 percent.105  Only 31 percent of Americans were 
considering building an emergency kit, while just over 20 percent considered coming up 
with a family communication plan for making contact with each other during 
emergencies.106   
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At first, it seems ironic that most Americans at this time felt unprepared, were 
unprepared, and yet did not intend to get prepared.  Either that or it shows a lack of 
concern or awareness.  When you consider that Americans also reported being more 
worried about gas prices than terrorism and natural disasters combined (Figure 3), their 
intentions might actually align with their concerns, even if the hierarchy of concerns 
seemed irrational.107  At the time of the surveys, America had not only seen peak gas 
prices, but also major hurricanes, millions of worldwide deaths expected from bird flu, a 
devastating earthquake in Pakistan and India, major flooding in the Northeastern United 
States, and terrorist threats to the New York City subway and one of the Baltimore 
tunnels (Figure 4).108  Yet, by a wide margin, the concern over gas prices dominated all 
others. 
Figure 3.   Percentage of Americans Worried109 
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Figure 4.   Context of the Survey110 
Furthermore, when you consider some of Americans’ reasons for not preparing, it 
makes sense that they would not intend to change anything.  Most people (54 percent) 
indicated that one reason they chose not to prepare was that they did not believe they 
would be personally affected by a disaster.  Over half (52 percent) said they had just not 
thought about it.  Almost half (45 percent) of Americans said that they elected to remain 
underprepared because they believed that nothing they could do would really make a 
difference if they were affected by disaster.111  It would seem, then, that either the experts 
are wrong, or many Americans are living in denial or ignorance about the potential for 
disaster to strike them.  Stephen Flynn offers this harsh assessment of American 
preparedness: 
Preparedness is not about being paranoid.  It is about being smart.  But too 
many Americans are acting dumb.  In surveys, the vast majority of us say 
that we believe preparedness is important but most of us are doing nothing 
concrete to act on that belief.  Most Americans pay so little attention to 
their surroundings that they are unaware they are living in areas that are at 
high risk for a disaster, when in fact 91 percent of us are.112 
Fortunately, there is also good news within these surveys.  The willingness of 
Americans to volunteer is unquestionable.  The immense recovery effort from Hurricane 
Katrina showcased Americans’ willingness to help others, in particular.  Americans have 
long shown a sense of selfless service and national unity in response to tragedy.  
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Remarkably, though, despite being underprepared themselves, almost 60 percent of 
Americans indicated they would be willing to take a more proactive role by volunteering 
to support homeland security efforts within their communities.  Furthermore, almost one-
third said they would be willing to give one hour per week to these efforts.113  It would 
seem that the desire of Americans to support others exceeds their desire to prepare 
themselves.  Ironically, we may be doing more harm than good by helping each other 
before taking care of ourselves—or perhaps this is not so ironic.  For those who have 
flown commercially, this might be analogous to placing your oxygen mask on yourself 
before assisting other passengers.  It is difficult to help others when you, yourself, are 
incapacitated.  This country is fortunate to be large enough to draw from the altruism of 
those regions not affected by disaster. 
The statistics from 2005 indicate that, even after the trauma of Hurricane Katrina,  
Americans (1) did not feel prepared, (2) were not prepared, and (3) did not intend to 
prepare for attacks or disasters.  These surveys also tell us something about complacency.  
Specifically, they contradict the argument, at least in this case, that society tends to “slide 
back into” complacency as the memories of recent tragedies fade.114  Rather, they 
suggest that complacency is there all along—both before and after disasters—despite the 
psychological effects of watching the desperation and suffering of fellow Americans 
night after night on television.115  Almost forty percent of Americans actually admitted 
that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita did nothing to motivate them to prepare for an 
emergency.116  Fortunately, homeland security officials have recognized lack of citizen 
engagement as a significant problem, and have focused a great deal of attention on 
correcting it. 
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B. THE CURRENT APPROACH 
1. First and Foremost: Awareness 
Derived from the lessons of Hurricane Katrina, the White House staff report 
directed, as one of two “immediate” priorities, the creation of a new “culture” in the 
United States.  The Culture of Preparedness was to “stress initiative at all levels,” but 
citizen and community preparedness was regarded as one of the most important means of 
terrorist attack prevention and “all hazards” resilience.117  The report pushed for a more 
aggressive and substantive public awareness campaign to encourage citizen preparedness 
in the ways that “Stop, Drop, and Roll” and “Buckle Up America” had encouraged fire 
and auto safety practices.118   
Therefore, the Department of Homeland Security got to work on spreading the 
message—or, more correctly, continued to work on spreading the message.  Actually, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) began the Ready campaign in 
February 2003.  The program sought  
to reduce fears and provide information by providing individuals specific 
actions they can take to protect themselves, their families and their 
communities in the wake of an attack, or another emergency situation.119 
The actions seemed simple enough:  (1) build an emergency kit; (2) make an 
emergency plan; and (3) stay informed and aware.  They were simple enough even to 
form a sort of mantra for people to remember easily:  “READY: make a kit, make a plan, 
and be informed.”120  It would seem to be just the right approach. 
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In fact, less than two years after being initiated, the Ad Council had declared the 
Ready campaign “one of the most successful campaign launches in its 62-year 
history.”121  By November 2004, the awareness effort was able to boast a number of great 
successes: 
• More than 210 million had seen or read about the campaign (regrettably, 
the author was not one of them). 
• $310 million in media support had been donated. 
• The website (www.Ready.gov) had reached more than 1.8 billion hits. 
• The toll-free number (1-800-BE-READY) had received 214,180 calls. 
• People had requested or downloaded more 3.6 million brochures.122 
More importantly, however, surveys had indicated an initial increase in citizen 
preparedness.  A September 2004 survey revealed the following figures: 
• 58 percent of Americans had taken at least one action toward preparedness 
• 10 percent increase (to 36 percent) in the number people with emergency 
kits  
• 9 percent increase (to 24 percent) among those who had emergency plans  
• An 11 percent increase (to 16 percent) in the number who had sought 
additional information about emergency actions.123 
Despite the initial indications of progress, officials remained cautious, 
acknowledging it was “too early to effectively gauge the long term effects of the 
campaign on public preparedness.”124  For over seven years now, FEMA has partnered 
with the Ad Council in sponsoring public service announcements, promoting their 
website, and holding public events, as in “National Preparedness Month,” to urge 
Americans to prepare.  Although certainly a primary component, “awareness” has been 
only one aspect of the DHS effort.  From the beginning, the department was directed to 
do more than just get the word out, but also to integrate citizens with their communities 
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in preparing for attacks and disasters.  The impetus for the department’s efforts originates 
from Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), issued in December 2003: 
The Secretary shall work with other appropriate Federal departments and 
agencies as well as State and local governments and the private sector to 
encourage active citizen participation and involvement in preparedness 
efforts. The Secretary shall periodically review and identify the best 
community practices for integrating private citizen capabilities into local 
preparedness efforts.125 
Though the overall goal of HSPD-8 was “to strengthen the preparedness of the 
United States to prevent and respond” to all hazards, the focus on engaging citizens 
seemed, from the start, to be limited exclusively to response capabilities.  Primary 
responsibility for achieving citizen participation, therefore, naturally fell to FEMA.  We 
have surveyed some of FEMA’s awareness efforts.  A closer look at their other programs 
tells us almost everything we need to know about the federal government’s basic 
framework for achieving greater citizen participation.  That is the concern of this section 
and the remainder of this thesis—the federal government’s fundamental strategy for 
getting individuals to take personal responsibility and to integrate with the rest of the 
homeland security enterprise, that their great potential might be realized. 
2. Organizing for Success 
FEMA’s citizen preparedness efforts are the responsibility of its Community 
Preparedness Division (CPD).  The CPD houses two key supporting programs, the 
Citizen Corps Program (CCP) and its subprogram, the Community Emergency Response 
Team (CERT) Program.  Through these programs, the functions of the Community 
Preparedness Division are to 
• Build a Culture of Preparedness. 
• Integrate government and non-government sectors at Federal, State, 
Tribal, local levels in all phases of emergency management. 
• Integrate Community Preparedness in National Policy. 
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• Develop and coordinate National Citizen Corps Council, Program 
Partners, and Affiliates. 
• Support State, Tribal, Local Citizen Corps Councils. 
• Conduct research on citizen and community preparedness.126 
The first function is a nebulous one, to say the least.  The idea of a Culture of 
Preparedness conveys a useful image, but that image is likely different for each person.  
The concept of building such a culture suggests an end state, but it is difficult to gauge 
when that state has been achieved.  Unfortunately, for FEMA, the White House left that 
for them to figure out.  Although the Katrina report offered “the new Culture” as a 
transformational “imperative,” they never were able to succinctly define it; and in three 
pages describing the many things such a culture must do, the extent of their “remedies” to 
fix the problems of citizen preparedness from Hurricane Katrina were (1) to have 
prominent leaders “begin a public dialogue,” (2) to build on and consolidate the existing 
awareness campaigns, and, (3) in general, “do more”—hardly a descriptive prescription 
for such a difficult problem.127  Nevertheless, the term “culture of preparedness” 
pervades the discourse on public preparedness.  Although this research never discovered 
a concise definition, it is likely that as long as surveys indicate there is room for 
improvement, the quest for the elusive “Culture” will continue.  The risk of chasing this 
Culture indefinitely, however, is that the concept itself will begin to lose any meaning it 
currently has due to overuse. 
Another relevant task of the CPD is to conduct research into citizen preparedness.  
This is done almost exclusively through survey data, often sponsored and compiled by 
the Citizen Corps.  Surveys are probably the most efficient way to gather needed data.  
They are useful for assessing preparedness levels—showing us what we need to improve, 
but also for gauging public attitudes, especially motivations and hindrances to desired 
behaviors—helping us determine how we might improve.  It is important to remember 
that no two surveys are the same, however, and all are subject to errors.  To be useful, 
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analysis requires careful consideration of the sample characteristics, the specific 
questions asked, the methods used to ask the questions, the order the questions are asked, 
and how the data is reported.  In one case, two surveys conducted with large samples of 
New York City residents attempted to determine what percentage of respondents had 
emergency kits.  One survey reported 23 percent; the other reported 88 percent.128  
Typically, however, data between surveys has been found to be useful for obtaining a 
general assessment and identify significant trends.  The Citizen Corps, in 2005, began 
highlighting the latest research developments in their Citizen Preparedness Reviews—a 
consolidated approach to periodically analyzing all recent survey results and the latest 
thematic focuses of research (e.g., youth preparedness education in Summer 2010).129  
As of July 2006, for example, the review reported having a database of 37 surveys related 
to individual preparedness.130  A clear focus apparent in the reviews is ensuring careful 
interpretation of survey results.131 
The Citizen Corps’ work extends far beyond surveys and research.  It is the 
principal volunteer organization for citizens interested in readying for all hazards.  The 
mission of the Citizen Corps Program is 
to harness the power of every individual through education, training, and 
volunteer service to make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared 
to respond to the threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues, and 
disasters of all kinds.132 
                                                 
128 Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Methodological Considerations and Key Findings in 
Preparedness Research," Citizen Preparedness Review, no. 1 (Summer 2005), 5, http://www.citizencorps 
.gov/downloads/pdf/ready/citizen_prep_review_issue_1.pdf (accessed November 25, 2010). 
129 Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Bringing Youth Preparedness Education to the 
Forefront: A Literature Review and Recommendations," Citizen Preparedness Review, no. 6 (Summer 
2010), http://www.citizencorps.gov/downloads/pdf/ready/citizen_prep_review_issue_6.pdf (accessed 
November 25, 2010). 
130 Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Patterns in Current Research and Future Research 
Opportunities," Citizen Preparedness Review, no. 3 (Summer 2006), 1, http://www.citizencorps.gov/ 
downloads/pdf/ready/citizen_prep_review_issue_3.pdf (accessed November 25, 2010). 
131 Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Update on Citizen Preparedness Research," Citizen 
Preparedness Review, no. 5 (Fall 2007), 3, http://www.citizencorps.gov/downloads/pdf/ready/ 
citizen_prep_review_issue_5.pdf (accessed November 25, 2010). 
132 Citizen Corps, "Citizen Corps Councils," Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/councils/ (accessed November 25, 2010).  Emphasis added. 
 59
At the time of writing, the Corps was comprised of 2,446 state, tribal, and local 
Councils, designed to plan and implement preparedness programs on the local level.133  
It partners with five other federal organizations that focus on integrating volunteer 
citizens and professionals into specialized teams intended for real world scenarios:  the 
Fire Corps, USAonWatch-Neighborhood Watch, the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), 
Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS), and Community Emergency Response Team 
(CERT) Program.134 
The second program assigned to the Community Preparedness Division, then, is 
CERT.  The Community Emergency Response Team Program  
educates people about disaster preparedness for hazards that may impact 
their area and trains them in basic disaster response skills, such as fire 
safety, light search and rescue, team organization, and disaster medical 
operations. Using the training learned in the classroom and during 
exercises, CERT members can assist others in their neighborhood or 
workplace following an event when professional responders are not 
immediately available to help. CERT members also are encouraged to 
support emergency response agencies by taking a more active role in 
emergency preparedness projects in their community.135 
Looking at each of these functions, missions, and descriptions is instructive of the 
government’s strategy:  education, training, volunteer service, assistance, 
encouragement.  These components are inarguably essential to solving the problem of 
getting Americans to prepare.  Education and training would address the large portion of 
the population that does not know how to prepare—54 percent of unprepared Americans 
according to one post-Katrina survey.136  Volunteer service would provide opportunities 
in which Americans seemed eager to participate, especially if they were able to assist 
others by doing so.  Of course, encouragement would always be warranted, especially for 
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those who were unsure of whether preparation would make any difference.  When tacked 
to an aggressive awareness campaign, these features would seem to make quite a well-
reasoned, robust strategy.  So how well has it worked? 
C. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH 
1. Americans Not Listening 
The White House called for a Culture of Preparedness primarily through 
reinvigorated awareness campaigns.  After almost five years from the release of that 
report, no such campaign has emerged—at least in terms of success.  Recent national 
preparedness surveys would indicate that the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
(FEMA) “Ready” campaign has thus far been ineffective.  FEMA’s 2009 Personal 
Preparedness in America survey of 4,461 U.S. households indicated the following: 
• More than 60 percent expected to rely on emergency responders (rather 
than themselves) within the first 72 hours after a disaster. 
• Less than half expected to rely on others in their neighborhood in the 
event of disaster. 
• Of the 57 percent who claimed to have stocked emergency kits at home, 
only food and water were mentioned by more than 42 percent of 
respondents when asked to list the items in their kits. 
• Only 44 percent had an emergency plan for their home. 
• Only 42 percent had participated in a workplace evacuation drill within 
the past year. 
• More than 34 percent believed that preparing for a terrorist attack would 
not help them respond to one; only 45 percent believed it would help them. 
• Only 25 percent intended to prepare within the next six months.137 
Just as telling as the statistics, once again, are the trends they have illuminated.  
The first five items listed were repeats from the 2007 survey.  Not one of these statistics 
improved by more than two percent from 2007 to 2009.  In fact, one of them was a step 
backward:  there were four percent more participants expecting to rely on emergency 
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responders following a disaster.  The national goal set in 2007 was for 72 to 80 percent of 
Americans to meet some of these basic criteria.138  Regardless of any goal, however, it is 
clear that the Culture of Preparedness is still just an idea in the United States. 
Incredibly, a quick review of other data from 2003, 2007, and 2009 reveals 
similar trends:  stagnation or negligible increases in preparedness for most areas, and 
decreases in preparedness for some areas.  From 2003 to 2009, for example, there was a 7 
percent increase in the number of respondents with emergency kits, but a 14 percent 
decrease in those with disaster plans.  Specific questions and trends from the surveys are 
shown in Tables 1–5. 
Table 1.   Disaster Supplies in Multiple Locations139 
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Table 2.   Home Disaster Supplies140 
Table 3.   Household Disaster Preparedness Plan141 
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Table 4.   Expectation of Reliance on Others142 
Table 5.   Barriers to Preparedness Training143 
2. If That Doesn’t Work, Try Harder 
FEMA’s research suggests, rather insists, that, for all of our efforts, Americans 
are still not moving.  Amazingly, the percentage doubled of people who said they had not 
received any preparedness training because it was difficult to get information on what to 
do (Table 5)!  Could this be a signal that the awareness campaigns have not had adequate 
reach?  The seventh annual “National Preparedness Month” came and went in September 
2010 and many of us probably never knew there was such a thing.  There are plenty of 
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reasons to believe that “the marketing strategy” for individual participation has not been 
aggressive enough.  In fact, this seems to be the conclusion of FEMA, whose eleven 
recommendations in the report essentially call for redoubling efforts to “reach” the 
American people.  Key recommendations include 
• Communicating more realistic expectations and responsibilities 
• More emphasis on the importance of emergency kits 
• Greater appreciation for the importance of emergency plans 
• Greater emphasis on drills and exercises 
• Awareness of vulnerabilities that motivates individuals to prepare 
• Preparedness and response education should include a focus on hazard-
specific actions 
• Emphasizing social networks and the concepts of mutual support 
• Messaging and community outreach efforts to support those considering 
taking action 
• Linking training and volunteer service to educating and encouraging 
others 
• Tailoring outreach efforts to targeted audiences 
• Greater collaboration between citizens and law enforcement144 
There is a discernable emphasis in each of these eleven summarized 
recommendations on communicating better in some way.  The overall recommendation 
seems to be keep doing what we are doing, but find better ways to do it.  This is not 
intended to be a criticism of the recommendations themselves.  The conclusions and 
recommendations wrought in the report were clearly thought out and appropriate for the 
analysis of the data.  Rather, the intention, here, is to highlight the tendency we have had 
to continue with the same approach, with minor tweaks, despite continually failing to 
achieve results.  “Try harder” was the approach suggested by the White House’s report 
on Katrina as well.  Awareness campaigns will always be part of a solid strategy, but this 
thesis argues there is a more fundamental reason for lack of participation among 
Americans. 
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2. Answering the Wrong Question 
The White House cited the successes of previous awareness campaigns as models 
for the preparedness effort.  The major difference with “Stop, Drop, and Roll,” however, 
was that it did not require citizens to do anything.  Preparedness does.  “Buckle Up 
America,” on the other hand, did ask people to take action:  to buckle their seatbelts when 
traveling in a vehicle—a seemingly small cost to individuals, but a difficult one for 
officials to overcome.  While this particular campaign may have claimed some success, 
the government nevertheless decided, ultimately, to augment its safety “awareness” with 
legal enforcement and other influential slogans, like “Click It or Ticket.”  One could 
argue now that a “culture of seatbelts” has at last emerged, but it required additional 
mechanisms to what we are currently throwing at the citizen engagement problem.  
Americans were not failing to wear seatbelts because they were unaware of the danger, 
but because they lacked the incentive to fight the inertia of everyday habits and change 
their behavior. 
A recent analysis of the awareness campaigns effectiveness indicated that “91 
percent of Americans agree that taking simple steps to prepare for emergencies could 
help protect themselves and their families in the event of an emergency,” but only 58 
percent have taken any of those steps.145  The director of the Ready campaign remarked, 
“That’s the gap that we’re ultimately dealing with.”  So now his office will look at 
“whether the message, which he said hasn’t been altered since 2003, is still 
appropriate.”146  Instead of asking if we should change the message, we should be asking 
if a message is what is going to get the population to move.  It has not so far.  Instead of 
asking what is wrong with the message, we should be asking why the message is not 
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working and consider that the answer might be because it is only a message.  Perhaps 
awareness is the wrong vehicle for nudging citizens to take an action.  Perhaps the 
problem needs deeper investigation. 
3. Inadequate Study 
One of the flaws with the current approach stems from not studying the problem 
adequately, particularly within academic circles.  While there has been widespread use of 
“research agencies” (companies primarily specializing in obtaining and analyzing survey 
data), DHS has not visibly leveraged another great asset of this country—its academic 
institutions—to investigate solutions to the problem.  This is likely due, at least in part, to 
the fact that no one seems to have agreed on what “homeland security” even is.  One 
respected homeland security graduate-level professor and academic director recently 
developed seven distinct, well-stated definitions for homeland security, based on the 
sources of several legitimate literatures.147  Some of the conflicting definitions even 
originated with the same federal homeland security agency.  This is evidence, of course, 
that homeland security—whatever it is—is still being worked out, even after eight years.  
Regardless of which idea of homeland security one uses, however, most have recognized 
that individuals are an integral part of it.  Nevertheless, the problem of how to engage 
them has not received much attention at the universities. 
A 2006 survey, by the same professor, documented about four dozen ways in 
which academic institutions, agencies, and textbook publishers conceptualized “the” 
homeland security field of study.148  When combined, these approaches identified over 
fifty different homeland security themes as primary topics.149  This research supports the 
notion that, at the time, educators were far from reaching even general agreement as to 
what topics the discipline of homeland security should include as its core.  The article did 
show agreement, however, that the topic of the “role of individuals in homeland security” 
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was hardly being considered a candidate.  This particular theme was found just once 
among the core topics of the four dozen sources reviewed.150  Subsequent research in 
2008 reflected a similar level of importance being placed on the topic across thirty-five 
undergraduate homeland security programs.151  In addition, of the 68 homeland security 
professionals who responded to a survey from the same study, only 56 percent identified 
the topic area as important.152  While it can still be argued that homeland security, as a 
professional field of study, remains in a developmental stage, the most recent strategic 
guidance from DHS, by its very nature, had the effect of instantly creating a gap within 
the discipline.153  The theme is now due for more focused attention among academia—if 
for no other reason than validation of the department’s claim as to the importance of 
individuals within the homeland security enterprise.  It is the intention of this thesis to 
help narrow the existing gap. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Officials have acknowledged that a change in culture is a long-term endeavor.  
However, it has been over nine years since 9/11, over seven years since the launch of 
FEMA’s preparedness programs, over five years since Hurricane Katrina, and the 
numbers are still “very concerning and frankly kind of frightening.”154  To quote the 
Katrina report, “more needs to be done”—but not more of the same.155  Awareness will 
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always be important, along with education, training, and volunteer service, but they are 
clearly not enough to move Americans to do something.  Six years of trying with little to 
show for it has demonstrated that something is missing from the approach.  “Trying 
harder” to fix the problem by repeatedly using the same approach is wasteful and 
irresponsible.  Rather, we need to be trying harder to analyze the problem, to determine 
what it is that is keeping Americans latent.  The surveys are actually a great tool, but we 
seem to be missing the point.  When 91 percent of Americans say they know individual 
preparedness is important, but only 58 percent have done anything about it, it should tell 
us that awareness is not the problem.   
Education is important to help Americans realize their lives and livelihoods really 
are at risk, but making individual Americans really believe that they could be affected 
personally or that the professionals may not save them is too high a mountain.  The past 
nine years have demonstrated that.  Even with the terror of 9/11, the casualties of war, 
and the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, people have taken the new “age” of homeland 
security in stride, perhaps complained at times, but have, for the most part, gone on about 
their daily routines, not even considering the real possibility that they could be touched.  
Any progress we might have in making believers will take too long to make it worth 
waiting.  In fact, some would argue we have already waited too long.  If Americans are 
deemed by officials to be so important to homeland security, then there are too many 
things riding on this—namely American lives.   
No matter which expert or survey you turn to, the conclusions seem to remain the 
same:  (1) the United States is still failing to leverage a critical asset and (2) American 
citizens have still not embraced their important role in homeland security.  We can 
continue with the same basic approach, waiting patiently for a “culture” to set in, or we 
can adopt a more proactive approach that demands quicker results.  By continuing to 
wait, we risk much.  A new framework for addressing the problem is needed, along with 
more focus on the problem’s source.  Chapter IV offers such a framework. 
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IV. WHY PEOPLE CHOOSE NOT TO PARTICIPATE 
The American people hold a strong sense of community, a belief in 
collective responsibility, and a willingness to do what is required of them 
to contribute to our common security and sustain our way of life.156 
Despite consensus among homeland security leaders that the American people are 
falling far short of fulfilling their homeland security responsibilities, very few are asking 
why.  Most are throwing what seem to be reasonable solutions toward the symptoms of 
the problem without considering the root cause with due diligence.  When surveys report 
that Americans do not know what to do to prepare, or do not believe they need to prepare, 
we quickly assume the fix is to tell them what they need to know or believe, to convince 
them that this stuff is important.  It might happen that increasing awareness will foster the 
desired “preparedness” mindset, that communicating more openly will encourage mutual 
trust, and that creating more opportunities will increase participation across the board.  
These things might happen, but so far, they have not.  To assume that Americans live in a 
vacuum—that they will only understand what we spoon-feed them—is naive.  Americans 
may be self-absorbed, but they are not helpless or stupid.  Americans are aware of 
disasters, of terrorist attacks, and of people who were not expecting terrible things to 
happen to them.  Americans also know how to get information if they want it.  Most have 
a world of information just one click away—at work, at home, in their pockets!  After 
almost a decade of trying to convince Americans that they are needed in homeland 
security, perhaps it is time to consider that lack of awareness is not the source of the 
problem.  Rather than attacking symptoms, we must fully contemplate the cause, and then 
act decisively, not encouragingly, to remedy the shortfall.  If individuals Americans truly 
are important to homeland security—and we have seen that they are—then too much is at 
stake to continue the current course. 
Perhaps Homeland Security officials should pursue more aggressive information 
campaigns, but American citizens who have yet to take a proactive approach to homeland 
security are not unaware that they can contribute to a more secure, better-prepared 
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society.  This chapter argues that individuals choose not to take particular actions—not to 
learn more about homeland security through countless credible websites, not to put 
together emergency kits and formulate emergency plans, not to volunteer within their 
communities.  Quite simply, most people do not participate in homeland security because 
they decide not to do so.  Furthermore, these decisions are perfectly logical, even while 
acknowledging the importance of homeland security.  When individuals contemplate 
whether to contribute, their considerations will not typically include their distrust of the 
government, the small number of opportunities from which to choose, or a lack of 
patriotic feeling.  Individuals choose not to participate in ways they know they could 
because they perceive these decisions to be in their best interest and, in that regard, the 
most rational choices they could make. 
This chapter argues that the problem of citizen nonparticipation is a collective 
action problem in which Americans are immobilized by their incentive to remain free 
riders in the production of a public good:  homeland security.  The chapter will explain 
the relevant concepts of the theory, their application to our problem, and mechanisms that 
would enable us to overcome the free-rider impasse.  The chapter will then use the 
developed framework to analyze a case in which citizens have embraced their role in 
homeland security:  the state of Israel, and attempt to extract lessons applicable to the 
United States. 
A. THE LOGIC BEHIND NONPARTICIPATION 
The most appropriate starting point for any examination of collective action 
theory is with Mancur Olson’s seminal work, The Logic of Collective Action.  Published 
in 1965, Olson contended with the prevailing view that a group of individuals, defined by 
common interests, would logically act on behalf of the group’s interests.157  The 
traditional view proceeds from the same notion that a rational individual will act on 
behalf of his or her individual interests.  Ironically, Olson was able to argue that this 
theory of group behavior was incorrect because all groups are composed of rational, self-
interested individuals. 
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1. Defining the Group 
First, let us consider what is meant by “a group.”  In the context of collective 
action, Olson reasoned that the primary purpose for forming organizations was to 
advance common interests of groups of individuals.158  Even unorganized groups, for the 
purpose of studying collective action, are characterized by at least one common interest.  
In fact, since unorganized groups do not have explicit memberships like organizations, 
the only defining quality of a group, in our case, is common interest.  In our problem, we 
will consider the common interest to be “homeland security”—whichever definition you 
prefer.  Therefore, any American resident who derives utility from keeping the homeland 
secure is in our group of interest.  Remember, utility is to individuals what profit is to 
businesses:  it is a “measure of benefits” that rational individuals are constantly trying to 
maximize.159  One economist offered this great illustration of the concept:   
I derive utility from getting a typhoid immunization and paying taxes.  
Neither of these things makes me particularly happy, but they do keep me 
from dying of typhoid or going to jail.  That, in the long run, makes me 
better off.160 
Recent research used to derive the 2010 Unisys Security Index for the United 
States reported that 89 percent of Americans are at least “somewhat concerned … about 
national security in relation to war or terrorism.”161  A Red Cross survey indicated that 
89 percent of Americans think it is important to prepare for disasters.162  Based on these 
data, we can assume that approximately 90 percent of Americans believe homeland 
security will make them better off.  This is “the group” we wish to examine here:  the 
very large group of individual Americans who believe that homeland security benefits 
them as individuals. 
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2. The Nature of Public Goods 
Another important concept to this study is that of public goods.  Public goods are 
said to hold two properties:  (1) “jointness of supply” and (2) “impossibility of 
exclusion.”163  A good is in joint supply when consumption by one person “does not 
reduce the amount available to anyone else.”164  It is actually difficult to think of goods 
that strictly meet this criterion.  National defense is often cited as an example, but even 
here, as more and more people “consume” defense, the “level” of defense realizable will 
diminish, such as if the population of state continues to grow, but the resources allocated 
to national defense do not.165  Practically speaking, ocean water is a physical good that 
might fit this description.  Some products of homeland security could be considered joint 
supplies; others could not.  For example, whether a foiled biological attack spared one 
civilian or one million would not reduce the amount of the “joint” good (prevention of 
biological attack, in this case) available.  On the other hand, if one citizen requires 
emergency responders to tend to him following a disaster, it will reduce the emergency 
response capability remaining for his neighbor.  Emergency response, therefore, would 
not be a good example of a joint supply.  The concept requires defining precisely the 
good being considered. 
The second property of a public good is that, if it is available to one person, it is 
impossible to prevent anyone else in the group from consuming it.166  In other words, 
even if others in the group do not pay for the good, they cannot be excluded from sharing 
in its benefits.  Common examples of goods exhibiting this characteristic are police 
services, public parks, broadcast television, interstate highways, or national defense.  
Once provided, it is impossible, or nearly so, to keep non-payers from consuming these 
types of goods.  Homeland security can be broadly considered to meet this criterion.  
Using our previous examples, it would be impossible to withhold the benefits of a 
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prevented biological attack from any person in the affected area, whether they paid taxes 
or not.  On the other hand, it might be possible to withhold life-saving emergency 
services from a “non-payer,” but our society would not allow that.  Such a system would 
be infeasible.  Olson permits this looser interpretation of “impossibility of exclusion” in 
his argument.167  In fact, in considering collective action problems, this is the only 
property of public goods with which we are concerned:  the infeasibility of excluding any 
person in the group from consuming the available good (14–15).  Again, in this case, the 
available good is homeland security. 
Tying our concepts of groups and public goods together, Olson claimed that “the 
achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common interest means that a 
public or collective good has been provided for that group” (15).  Here it is important to 
note that it does not matter whether everyone in the group is aware of everyone else in 
the group.  For example, consider a member of the community who has a strong interest 
in (or would derive utility from) building effective local emergency response capability.  
He is part of a large group of people in the community who share this common interest.  
If other members of the group work to realize this goal, say through CERT training or 
other volunteer opportunities, the first member will reap the perceived benefits of the 
group effort whether anyone else ever knew he was part of the group in the first place. 
3. The Irony of Self-Interest in Predicting Large Group Behavior 
If the members of a group would be better off when that group achieved its 
objectives, then it would seem a reasonable assumption that a rational, self-interested 
individual belonging to the group would act in accordance with group interests.  Olson 
makes the case that this assumption does not follow logically.  To the contrary, he asserts 
that  
…though all of the members of the group have a common interest in 
obtaining [a] collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying 
the cost of providing that collective good.  Each would prefer that the 
others pay the entire cost, and ordinarily would get any benefit whether he 
had borne part of the cost or not. (21) 
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Therefore, Olson argues, “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to 
achieve their common or group interests” unless the group is very small or unless 
coercion or some other mechanism is in place to influence individuals to do so (2).168  
More strikingly, he argues that this assertion holds true even when the group 
unanimously agrees on the “common good” and the ways to achieve it (1–2).  In terms of 
group characteristics, size is the greatest determinant of whether a group is likely to 
achieve its collective purpose. 
4. Why Group Size Matters 
The reason group size is so important in predicting group success is that an 
individual’s decision to act in the interest of the group depends on whether that 
individual’s actions are perceptible to other members of the group.  The larger the group, 
the less perceptible individual actions are (45).  In order to facilitate analysis of the 
collective action problem, Olson classifies three types of groups: 
• Small “Privileged” Groups.  At least one member has the incentive to 
ensure the collective interest is achieved, even if that member has to bear 
the entire cost of providing it.   
• “Intermediate” Groups.  No member receives a large enough share of the 
group benefit to give them an incentive to bear the entire cost themselves, 
but the group is not large enough to ensure no member will notice whether 
any other member is contributing.  Olson says this type of group may or 
may not obtain their collective good, but definitely will not obtain it 
without some level of group organization and coordination. 
• Very Large “Latent” Groups.  If one member does not act on behalf of the 
group interest, no other member will be noticeably affected or have a 
reason to react. (49–50) 
From Olson’s taxonomy, it is clear that the larger the group, the greater the 
difficulty the group will likely have in obtaining its collective good.  The very large 
group, therefore, Olson refers to as “latent” because it has the potential to act, but will 
only do so with an external mechanism to motivate its individual members to act in the  
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group’s interests (51).  Our group, which is a very large group with a common interest in 
providing homeland security, would be considered a “latent” group by Olson’s 
description. 
5. Separate and “Selective” Incentives 
“By definition,” Olson argues, “an individual in a ‘latent’ group … cannot make a 
noticeable contribution to any group effort, and since no one in the group will react if he 
makes not contribution, he has no incentive to contribute” (50).  Therefore, he reasons, 
“Only a separate and ‘selective’ incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent 
group to act in a group-oriented way” (51).  An incentive must be separate in that it is 
different from the collective good that the group is trying to obtain.  Furthermore, it must 
be selective in that it is not indiscriminately offered to anyone in the group, like the 
collective good itself, but rather is limited to the individuals who contribute to the 
attainment of that collective good.  Selective incentives can be either positive or negative 
in nature—by rewarding those who contribute to the group’s goals, or by punishing those 
who do not (51). 
Selective incentives need not be economic in nature.  Olson acknowledges that we 
must consider non-financial incentives as well, such as “prestige, respect, friendship, and 
other social and psychological objectives” (60).  Social incentives work because they are 
separate from the collective good itself and they are selective by nature.  They serve to 
highlight individuals among the group by either rewarding individuals for significant 
contributions (e.g., prestige) or just “getting involved” (as with friendship)—or punishing 
individuals by ostracizing them when they do not act in the interest of the group (61).  
However, Olson makes the strong argument that “social pressure and social incentives” 
are really only effective in smaller groups, where “face-to-face contact” is much more 
likely (62).  This is certainly not a characteristic of our group of American “citizens-at-
large,” at least not to the extent that there are prevalent social incentives for taking 
individual actions purely in the interest of homeland security.   
However, Olson does offer a way for large groups to use incentives that are 
particularly effective with smaller groups—by federating the large group.  In other words, 
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when a very large group is divided into many smaller groups, all seeking to achieve the 
greater interests of the large group, the large latent group is able to use social incentives 
to stimulate group-oriented action.  In fact, Olson says this is the only practical way for 
large groups to use social incentives effectively (63). 
6. Altruism Will Not Mobilize a Latent Group 
One common criticism of Olson’s theory—and of many economics-based 
explanations for human behavior in general—is that the model of “self-interested” 
individuals leaves no room for selfless good deeds.  This is not true.  Self-interest is not 
the same as selfish interest.  The argument here is that individuals will seek to maximize 
their own utility, not their selfish gains.  Many people will decide to act out of 
selflessness because it pleases them to do so.  They gain something from self-sacrifice 
that is greater than the cost required.  If that were not so, they would not do it. 
One author gave us this example of remarkable selflessness: 
In 1999, the New York Times published the obituary of Oseola McCarty, a 
woman who died at the age of ninety-one after spending her life working 
as a laundress in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. She had lived alone in a small, 
sparsely furnished house with a black-and-white television that received 
only one channel.  What made Ms. McCarty exceptional is that she was by 
no means poor.  In fact, four years before her death she gave away 
$150,000 to the University of Southern Mississippi—a school that she had 
never attended—to endow a scholarship for poor students.169 
Ms. McCarty was a selfless individual who gained greater utility from saving up 
her money and giving it away, than from living in a nicer home with better furnishings.  
The economic model of the rational, self-seeking individual has room for the selfless 
individual.  However, even this person will not be motivated to contribute to the interests 
of very large group. 
Consider that Ms. McCarty had countless scholarship funds to which she could 
have donated her life savings, and probably with greater ease than establishing a new 
scholarship.  Furthermore, she probably could have targeted the same group of students 
                                                 
169 Wheelan, Naked Economics, 7–8. 
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as she did with her new fund.  The likely reason that she did not, however, is that she 
wanted to use her money in such a way that a difference might be perceived by her taking 
that action.  This is not to say that she even had in mind the recognition she might receive 
for such a solitary gift, but rather she would not want to “give all she had” to a large 
existing foundation that would “dilute” the gift’s effects in others’ lives.  She apparently 
had in mind to have a greater effect on perhaps fewer students.  Olson says it best:  
Even if the member of a large group were to neglect his own interests 
entirely, he still would not rationally contribute toward the provision of 
any collective or public good, since his own contribution would not be 
perceptible. 
Selfless behavior that has no perceptible effect is sometimes not even 
considered praiseworthy.  A man who tried to hold back a flood with a 
pail would probably be considered more of a crank than a saint, even by 
those he was trying to help.170 
Not even selfless sacrifice is likely to effectively mobilize a “latent” group toward 
attainment of its collective objectives.  Consider the effect an all-volunteer military 
service might have had on the outcome of World War II.  For that matter, if the U.S. 
Armed Forces today had to rely exclusively on its members’ willingness to sacrifice 
themselves for the defense of their country—one of the noblest of causes by many 
accounts—our military capability would not be nearly what it is today. 
7. Patriotism and “Sense of Community” Are Not Enough 
Many critics would argue that “emotional and ideological elements” are often 
enough to propel large organizations toward achievement of their common goals.171  In 
essence, that is what the Department of Homeland Security is arguing in this chapter’s 
opening quote.  Perhaps the greatest example refuting the argument is in one of the most 
important organizations there is:  the state.  If any large group has an emotional or 
ideological motivation to contribute to a common good, it is the citizens of a nation-state, 
such as the United States.  Yet, as Olson puts it,  
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despite the force of patriotism, the appeal of the national ideology, the 
bond of a common culture, and the indispensability of the system of law 
and order, no major state in modern history has been able to support itself 
through voluntary dues or contributions.172 
Rather, states have always had to rely on the coercive mechanism of taxes.  The reason 
for this is that the provisions of the state are, by nature, public goods, much like 
homeland security.  No one citizen in good standing can be feasibly excluded from the 
benefits of a state’s most basic services, be it the armed forces, police services, the court 
system, etc.  Even the state, “with all of the emotional resources at its command, cannot 
finance its most basic and vital activities without resort to compulsion.”173  The 
homeland security enterprise, likewise, should not expect to rely on “a strong sense of 
community, a belief in collective responsibility, and a willingness to do what is required” 
to obtain the necessary participation from its citizens—not without additional 
mechanisms or institutions in place. 
8. What This Means to U.S. Homeland Security 
When considering the challenge of garnering greater individual participation in 
homeland security, Olson’s collective action model offers a powerful framework.  To use 
it effectively, we must understand why it is applicable, whom it applies to, and how it 
applies. 
a. The Applicability of the Model 
We have attempted to keep our homeland security problem in mind, while 
discussing the theory.  First, Olson’s model applies because we assume there is group of 
individuals who have a common interest in sharing the benefits of homeland security.  
Second, Olson’s collective action theory applies to our problem because we are able to 
treat homeland security as a public good.  Specifically, by providing homeland security 
and all that it includes, we are not able to feasibly exclude anyone who might benefit 
from it, regardless of whether they contribute to its provision.  We cannot prevent a large-
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scale terrorist attack on one contributing citizen without providing the same benefit for all 
of her non-contributing neighbors.  Likewise, we said it would be infeasible in our 
society, according to our values, to withhold life-saving emergency response services 
from a disaster victim simply because he decided not to prepare an emergency kit or 
evacuate as ordered.  The victim who put his own life in danger by neglecting to prepare 
will receive the same services that his ultra prepared neighbor would if she needed 
assistance.  Finally, Olson’s model is particularly applicable to our problem because, as 
we have seen, optimum homeland security can only be achieved when the group 
(individual Americans) contributes to its production. 
b. To Whom the Model Applies 
According to Olson’s treatment of groups, our group in this problem 
includes any individual who has a common interest in homeland security.  Furthermore, 
we can safely assume that this group includes a huge majority of Americans, if not all.  It 
is, indeed, a very large group.  In reality, however, homeland security is comprised of a 
great number of independent and interdependent interests.  Broadly, these interests 
include prevention of terrorism, border security, immigration control, cybersecurity, 
resilience from attacks and natural disasters, and strengthening homeland security overall.  
Not everyone has the same level of interest in each aspect of homeland security.  
Additionally, not everyone perceives every aspect of homeland security to be a public 
good.  These factors result in varying types and levels of contributions from among the 
group. 
For example, given the group just defined, survey data might suggest that 
either Olson’s theory does not apply, or it is incorrect.  After all, there are quite a large 
number of Americans doing something to contribute to preparedness or some other aspect 
of homeland security in their individual capacities.  Olson’s theory says they will not do 
this without separate and selective incentives, and social incentives, in particular, are 
unlikely to work in a very large group.  If 57 percent of Americans are contributing to 
homeland security by setting aside supplies in their homes to be used only in the case of a 
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disaster, how can Olson’s theory correctly fit?174  After all, we also saw that 61 percent 
of Americans expect to rely largely on fire, police, and emergency personnel in the first 
72 hours following a disaster.175  At the very least, 18 percent of those surveyed belonged 
to both groups.176  Why would any of these people bear the cost of contributing by better 
preparing themselves if they expected to rely on emergency response services?  How can 
Olson’s theory apply to this case?  The reason for the apparent contradiction here is due 
to differing perceptions among individuals as to the nature, benefits, and costs of the 
good—in this case preparedness. 
For those individuals who do prepare for disasters and attacks, and prepare 
completely (surveys show this to be a small group), preparedness is perceived as a 
noncollective (private versus public) good whose benefits outweigh its costs.  By this, we 
mean that these individuals perceive they are bearing the cost to obtain a good that the 
group will not provide for them.  In particular, they perceive personal preparedness to be 
a source of protection from disaster or emergency that is unobtainable from the group.   
Other individuals will partially prepare to the extent that they perceive 
they are obtaining a noncollective benefit.  For example, a person might stock a flashlight 
and a battery-powered radio because they are able to use them for other purposes, such as 
routine power outages, or even camping.  They would not expect the group interested in 
homeland security to provide these types of benefits so they are willing to bear the cost 
for them.   
Additionally, some individuals might partially prepare because they do not 
perceive a net cost in doing so.  Many of those surveyed may respond that they have 
stocked food and water for use in emergencies because these are items they would 
purchase anyway.  Buying some of these supplies in bulk may further reduce per unit 
costs of these items both financially as well as in terms of the time and energy that is 
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spent making trips to the store.  Many of the reported emergency food and water kits may 
exist by virtue of the fact that many individuals routinely buy wholesale foods. 
To the extent that an individual in our group perceives a particular 
contribution to homeland security to provide him or her a noncollective good, 
unobtainable from the group itself, he or she may decide to bear the cost of that 
contribution.  An individual will do this when the perceived benefits of the noncollective 
good outweigh perceived costs of obtaining it—in other words, when the individual 
derives utility from taking the action.  However, when the good is perceived to be a 
collective good, one that will likely be provided by the group, the individual will be 
unwilling to bear any cost in providing it without a separate and selective incentive.  
Olson’s model applies to all individuals who have a common interest in homeland 
security, but an individual’s perception of the nature, benefits, and costs of a particular 
homeland security good will have everything to do with whether he or she will contribute 
to its provision. 
c. How the Model Applies 
Most individuals would perceive gaining some amount of utility—even if 
minuscule—by having a household prepared for disasters, yet many do not prepare.  
Why?  They perceive the costs (in money, time, and effort) of preparing to be greater 
than the benefits of being prepared.  We can get a better idea of the specific costs 
perceived by individuals when we analyze respondents’ answers to a particular question 
in the most recent Citizen Corps survey.  This question was posed to individuals who had 
done nothing to prepare or were not intending to prepare for disasters.  The question 
asked these individuals to identify the listed potential barriers to preparedness as either a 
“primary reason, somewhat of a reason, or not a reason at all” for them not taking any 
preparedness steps.177  Table 6 shows the results. 
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Table 6.   Primary Reasons Cited as Barriers to Preparedness178 
Based on the results from 2009, we can determine that individual 
Americans find the following factors to be at least “somewhat of a reason” for not 
preparing.179  Beyond that, we can restate these reasons to show how individuals weigh 
the decision of whether to prepare from a cost-benefit perspective: 
• Emergency responders will help me (67 percent) 
• Restated:  I will get help from the group whether I contribute or 
not (emergency response as a public good; Olson’s classic case:  
any perceived cost of preparing would likely keep these people 
from contributing in this way) 
• Have not had time (54 percent) 
• Restated:  The costs in time it would take to prepare, plus any other 
perceived costs, have thus far outweighed the perceived benefits of 
preparing. 
• Do not know what to do (57 percent) 
                                                 
178 From Federal Emergency Management Agency, Personal Preparedness, 20. 
179 This is found by subtracting the percentage of respondents identified under “Not A Reason At All” 
from 100 percent.  We assume, here, that all respondents who did not mark “not a reason” annotated either 
“somewhat of a reason” or “primary reason.” 
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• Restated:  The costs (efforts) of finding out how to prepare, plus 
any other perceived costs, outweigh the perceived benefits of 
preparing. 
• Costs too much (42 percent) 
• Restated:  The financial costs of preparing, plus any other 
perceived costs, outweigh the perceived benefits of preparing. 
• Do not think it will make a difference (41 percent) 
• Restated:  The perceived utility gained by preparing is outweighed 
by any perceived costs of preparing. 
• Do not want to think about it (43 percent) 
• Restated:  The cost of thinking about preparing (time, effort, 
emotional stress), plus any other perceived costs, outweigh the 
perceived benefits of preparing. 
• Do not think I would be able to (32 percent) 
• Restated:  The perceived utility of preparing might be worth the 
perceived costs, but the costs are perceived to be insurmountable 
for the individual, thereby making adequate preparation impossible 
for them to achieve without someone else’s help, if able to achieve 
it at all.  Examples might be a disabled or elderly person who does 
not believe they could ever bear the costs of preparing, or someone 
who believes adequate preparation for the worst disaster would be 
unaffordable. 
Analysis of these data is made easier when we consider that personal 
preparedness is a means of protecting an individual and his or her family from the 
harmful effects of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or other emergencies.  The good 
being considered, in this case, then, is protection from all hazards.  It is clear from the 
responses above, that two-thirds of those who have chosen not to take personal 
preparedness steps believe, at least on some level, that emergency response personnel 
will protect them from all hazards.  These individuals perceive protection from all 
hazards to be a collective good.  Furthermore, this perception is one thing that keeps 
them from contributing to the nation’s overall protection, or resilience, by preparing 
themselves.  These individuals are our classic free riders described by Olson’s theory of 
collective action.  They have a common interest in being protected and, by default, an 
interest in being resilient, but believe that the group will provide them that protection 
whether they contribute or not.  These people form a very large group that includes not 
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only those who have not taken any preparedness steps, but also those who have only 
taken steps that provide them a noncollective benefit or that do not require them to bear 
any perceived costs.  Olson’s model is particularly useful for this group of individuals:  it 
tells us that we should not hope for group-oriented behavior from them until (1) their 
perception is changed or (2) they are given separate and selective incentives to contribute.  
Changing perceptions or beliefs can be a long, difficult process, as we have seen with 
preparedness awareness campaigns.  With many individuals, a change might never be 
realized.  Incentives, on the other hand, are effective in spite of personal beliefs.  They 
deal exclusively with the existing cost-benefit relationship and therefore are able to 
achieve results almost immediately. 
The rest of the responses indicate people who might perceive that they 
could provide themselves some protection from hazards, but for whom the costs of 
providing that protection outweigh the perceived benefits.  Although they do not 
necessarily believe that the group will provide their protection, they would require a 
reduction in perceived cost, an increase in perceived benefit, or both to get them to take 
personal preparedness actions.  These people can be mobilized using the same types of 
mechanisms prescribed by Olson for dealing with large latent groups—namely positive 
or negative incentives.  Positive incentives increase the perceived benefit of taking action.  
Negative incentives increase the perceived costs of not taking action.  Even for those who 
do not believe preparedness has any utility (because it will not make a difference) can 
derive utility by taking action when a separate incentive is tied to that action.   
Ultimately, no individual will mobilize until he or she perceives the 
individual costs of contributing to be less than the personal benefits of the particular 
contribution.  We can use incentives to shift that balance.  When the individual is a 
member of the large latent group that perceives protection from all hazards to be a 
collective good, the incentive must be separate from the good itself—that is, it must 
provide the individual something other than protection, in the example.  Additionally, the 
incentive must be selective in that it is only available to those who contribute (by 
preparing for disaster, in this case) when it is a positive incentive, or to those who do not 
contribute when it is a negative incentive. 
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B. THREE GENERAL SOLUTIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
We have focused a great deal on personal preparedness, largely because it is the 
major emphasis of homeland security officials, but also because it is an area for which we 
have a great deal of data.  Olson’s theory of collective action, however, can be applied 
and useful for any scenario in which (1) there is a collective homeland security good that 
needs to be provided by individuals; (2) there is a group of individuals with a common 
interest in providing that good; and (3) the good, once provided, cannot be feasibly 
withheld from anyone in the group.  When the group is very large, individuals will only 
be mobilized to act in the interest of the group if there is a separate and selective 
incentive to do so.  For these cases, in accordance with the principles of collective action 
as rendered by Olson, there are three distinct possibilities for gaining the participation of 
those Americans who have not yet decided to act.  These mechanisms will also be 
effective for those individuals who perceive that the good will not be provided by the 
group (a noncollective good), but still do not provide it because they perceive the costs to 
be greater than the benefits. 
1. Incentives 
Of the three general solutions offered here, incentives are perhaps the most 
practical and politically acceptable alternative for engaging “latent” citizens in homeland 
security.  Incentives are flexible, can be targeted to achieve specific behaviors from 
specific groups of individuals, and keep the desired individual behavior on a voluntary 
basis.   
Incentives are flexible in a number of ways.  First, they can be offered by any 
homeland security entity at any level.  The federal government can offer direct incentives 
in the form of income tax breaks.  States can offer incentives in the form of income or 
sales tax breaks.  Counties can offer lower property taxes.  Communities can offer 
incentives by reducing municipal fees, such as for downtown parking.  The private sector 
can offer free products or rebates on purchases.  Incentives are an available tool for just 
about any organization trying to achieve a particular behavior.   
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Second, incentives are flexible because they can be virtually unrelated to the 
action being incentivized.  In fact, Olson’s theory requires that they are unrelated to the 
extent that the incentive provides a benefit “separate” from that of the action itself.  For 
example, Radio Shack could offer a free battery-powered radio with purchases over 
$100.180  The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) could offer a reduced licensing fee 
for proving that you have an emergency kit matched to that particular vehicle.  
Conversely, the DMV could raise vehicle licensing fees for all vehicles that do not have a 
matched emergency kit.  This is the third way in which incentives are flexible.  They can 
be applied positively to add a benefit to the desired action or negatively to raise the cost 
of not taking the desired action.  When applied negatively, they give the incentive 
providers an opportunity to increase revenue while encouraging the desired behavior, 
such as higher fuel taxes that encourage people to reduce consumption, or the 
aforementioned higher licensing fees. 
Incentives are also flexible because they can be directed at particular groups.  
Lower income families can be targeted using financial incentives, for example.  Owners 
of homes of particular types or in particular locations can be targeted with property tax or 
insurance incentives.  Automobile owners can be targeted with insurance or registration 
fee incentives.  There are countless ways to apply incentives through various 
combinations of provider, type of incentive, targeted behavior, targeted individuals, and 
nature of incentive (positive or negative).  The ways to employ incentives are almost 
entirely limited by one’s imagination.   
There is, however, another limit to the use of incentives.  The behavior being 
incentivized must be verifiable.  This can make incentivizing certain behaviors quite 
challenging.  For example, it might be difficult to incentivize having a fully stocked home 
emergency kit because it would be difficult or impractical to verify.  One could, however, 
incentivize buying pre-built kits, but this might not be as effective as reducing 
homeowners’ insurance rates for having a kit, for example. 
                                                 
180 Radio Shack might do this because they are receiving an incentive from the federal government for 
providing household emergency supplies. 
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Finally, what makes incentives the most politically acceptable alternative of the 
three general solutions given is that it still relies on voluntary behavior to achieve the 
desired outcome.  Americans may grumble about higher taxes or increased fees, but these 
negative incentives will not have the political backlash of a new law that fined people for 
not having an emergency kit in their car when pulled over for some other reason. 
A disadvantage of incentives is that, in order to reward individuals for 
contributing to homeland security, it may exact a cost from the offering entity.  
Additionally, some incentives may require advertising to make people aware of their 
existence.  Many of these advertisements, however, might be able to be combined with 
existing awareness campaign messages. 
2. Coercion 
Coercion is perhaps the least politically acceptable solution to gaining the 
participation of citizens.  It might loosely be considered a negative incentive, but 
coercion is such that it makes compliance seem mandatory to individuals.  When actions 
are required by law, are able to be enforced, and are punishable by fines or imprisonment, 
for example, coercion is being used.  Seatbelt laws are a coercive instrument.  Higher fuel 
taxes are not. 
Coercion is effective to the extent that the behavior can be enforced.  For 
example, many states have enacted laws prohibiting handheld cell phone use while 
driving; however, you may have noticed a large number of people still using them.  This 
is because the law is difficult to enforce.  On the other hand, driving without a current 
vehicle registration is much less common. 
Coercion also requires that punishments for noncompliance are great enough to 
make the cost of not taking the action greater than the net cost taking the action.  Often 
the stigma of violating the law can be a powerful motivator to comply.  However, this is 
not always the case.  Many people get multiple speeding tickets because the risk (cost and 
likelihood of bearing the cost) of speeding is perceived to be worth the benefits.  
“Multiple-offense” penalties are designed to tip the cost-benefit balance for individuals 
who fit this category. 
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Coercion is not likely to be as effective as incentives when one of the goals is to 
get individuals to “embrace” the behavior that is trying to be achieved, such as in the 
“culture of preparedness.”  Coercion has a tendency to place the individual’s focus on 
avoiding the punishment rather than on the underlying reason for the new behavior.  
Resentment is a more likely outcome than constructive new beliefs about the importance 
of homeland security 
Despite some of its disadvantages, however, coercion will be the most appropriate 
mechanism for achieving a desired behavior when widespread compliance is vitally 
important.  For example, in the unlikely case that the federal government determined in-
car emergency kits were vitally important to national resilience, they would most likely 
achieve greater participation through legal enforcement than by offering incentives.  In 
the case of national security, coercion might be worth its political consequences. 
3. “Federation” 
The final way to mobilize a large latent group of citizens with a common interest 
in homeland security is simply to organize it into smaller groups.  The goal in doing so is 
to attain groups small enough that (1) individuals not contributing will be noticed by 
other individuals, and ultimately, (2) at least one individual will find the benefit of taking 
the desired action to be worth bearing the entire cost himself.  If the first trait is achieved, 
Olson calls this an “intermediate” group that may or may not achieve the group’s interest, 
but will only achieve it through organization and coordination within the group.  If the 
second trait is also achieved, Olson calls this a “privileged” group because this size of 
group will achieve its group objective, even if not at an optimal level. 
For groups this small to emerge unaided from the very large group with a 
common interest in homeland security is highly unlikely.  These types of groups are one 
promising feature of the Citizen Corps’ local councils.  However, even at a community 
level, the group interested in homeland security is still too large to be considered an 
intermediate group because the inaction of one person is not discernable to the rest of the 
group.  For a group to be small enough to become an “intermediate” or “privileged” 
group would require something more like neighborhood-sized groups of a handful of 
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residents or families—groups akin to neighborhood watch groups.  Neighborhood watch 
groups are formed on a voluntary basis, however.  To achieve measureable homeland 
security benefits from this mechanism would require formal organization across the 
entire nation.  Furthermore, residents would need some reason to join such a group.  A 
neighborhood “homeland security” group is not likely to attract widespread participation 
without its own mechanisms.  Here, again, incentives or coercion could be used.  
Compulsory membership to such groups, however, would be politically infeasible, at 
least on a nationwide level, so we will not even consider it here. 
Incentives, on the other hand, may have some promise for developing functioning 
“federal” groups.  For example, counties could divide residential areas into sufficiently 
small zones eligible for property tax breaks.  These tax incentives would be calculated 
based on the level of compliance with particular homeland security requirements within 
that zone.  On a voluntary basis, each zone might have a designated reporting 
representative who would serve to coordinate with neighbors in verifying stocked 
emergency kits, for example.  If the zone achieved 80 percent compliance, each 
household in the zone might receive a corresponding decrease in tax rate.  If the zones 
had small enough memberships, the homeland security enterprise might achieve two 
outcomes that are unlikely in large groups:  (1) social incentives would become available 
and (2) some individuals would felt led to bear the entire cost themselves.  Let us 
consider each outcome in turn. 
First, if a neighborhood-sized group of four homeowners was presented such a 
system, the contributions of each neighbor would be perceptible to the others.  Inaction 
by one would affect all four homeowners, and there is a significant potential for social 
pressure to be applied to that one.  Olson considered such groups to be “twice blessed in 
that they have not only economic incentives, but also perhaps social incentives that lead 
their members to work toward the achievement of the collective goods.”181  Second, if 
that social pressure did not work, you would be more likely to have at least one 
homeowner who is willing to bear the entire cost for the nonparticipating homeowners.  
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For that matter, you may have multiple participators willing to share the cost for the non-
participators in order to achieve the common interest, which, in this case, might not even 
be homeland security or preparedness, but a tax break.  Regardless of motivation, such a 
mechanism has a greater likelihood of achieving a desired group-oriented homeland 
security action than with no such system at all.  Most importantly, the mechanism of 
“federating” the very large group toward smaller “privileged” groups could remain 
completely voluntary. 
The idea given was just one of hundreds of possibilities, again limited by 
imagination.  The illustration here was intended primarily to suggest that such a 
mechanism as “federal” groups might be feasible and would have the promise of greatly 
increasing citizen engagement in homeland security missions.  For such groups to be 
effective, however, they must be sufficiently small to achieve visibility of individual 
contributions to other members in the group and, ideally, to achieve at least one member 
who would be willing to bear the entire cost to achieve the group’s objective.  Of course, 
offering incentives to realize these small groups of individuals would require 
commitment of resources from the sponsoring agency—very likely the federal or state 
governments, ultimately. 
C. ISRAEL:  LESSONS IN OVERCOMING THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM 
Israel is well known for its high level of public involvement in security matters.  It 
has been the target of hundreds of terrorist attacks over the past six decades, so the 
importance of its relatively small population taking an active role is readily apparent.  
However, to assume that this level of citizen engagement is the natural, sociological 
result of a high-threat environment would be naive.  With a population in the millions and 
terrorist attack fatalities in the hundreds from 2000 to 2007, it would be rational for an 
Israeli citizen to reason that responsibility for his personal security could rest almost 
entirely on the backs of others.182  Even in a place as dangerous as Israel, one can 
imagine an incentive to free ride.  A likely reason free riding is not a problem in Israel, as 
                                                 
182 Charles Lenchner, "Statistics, Israel, Palestine," Change.org, http://humanrights.change.org/blog/ 
view/statistics_israel_palestine (accessed June 10, 2010). 
 91
it is in the United States, is that a culture akin to the American-envisioned “Culture of 
Preparedness” already exists—and the Israeli government has played a direct role in 
making it a reality. 
The purpose of this section is to examine the strategies used by Israel to 
encourage citizen involvement in homeland security and to seek applications from the 
Israeli model for use in the United States.  Its secondary purpose is to attempt to validate 
the applicability of Olson’s collective action theory—and the general solutions we 
derived—to a state that has been able to overcome the free rider problem.  First, we will 
examine how citizen engagement is integral to the Israeli approach by considering the 
specific security practices used by Israeli citizens.  Next, we will examine the 
mechanisms used by the Israeli government to leverage its citizens as full partners in 
homeland security.  Finally, we will attempt to draw parallels from the Israeli approach to 
the general framework we have proposed for the United States.  Our concern is not with 
extracting specific homeland security practices.  The Israeli and American cases are 
much too different.  Rather, the intent is to examine the institutional framework Israel has 
used to engage its citizens in homeland security.  To the extent that each country is 
composed of millions of rational, self-interested individuals with a natural incentive to 
free ride, we consider such comparisons valid—for the principles of collective action are 
based on human nature. 
1. Citizen Involvement 
In Israel, homeland security is not just a task for the government:  it is a way of 
life for the citizens.  From a very early age, Israeli children are taught not only how to 
prepare for terrorist attacks, but that security is their responsibility as Israeli citizens.  As 
they advance toward high school their homeland security education and training continue, 
so that by the time they are adults, security has become second nature.  As adults, Israelis 
assume proactive roles in providing security within their communities as well as 
imparting a security mindset to successive generations. 
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a. Education and Training 
Homeland security education and training in Israel have been instituted for 
all age levels, but the greatest impact to the culture is likely achieved at the younger ages.  
In elementary school, Israeli children are taught about chemical and biological weapons, 
including how to use a gas mask.183  They also learn how to identify suspicious people 
and unusual situations.184  In fifth grade, students complete two solid days of “readiness 
and emergency preparedness” training.185  In high school, students in the two eldest 
classes serve as emergency response volunteers, providing direct assistance to responders 
in times of disaster.186  The importance of personal involvement is reinforced for children 
when they see their parents providing security at their school for a few days out of each 
year.  By the age of eighteen, most Israeli citizens enter the Israeli army, which greatly 
enhances their security training.  Developing a culture of security and preparedness is 
much more effective if it starts with the younger members of a society.  Starting there, 
however, still requires the deliberate actions of security-minded adults. 
b. Voluntarism 
Israel has not achieved its level of public involvement entirely through 
enforcement of education or other legislative measures.  This is evidenced by the large 
number of volunteers who choose to get involved in homeland security.  The most 
notable case of voluntarism is the Civil Guard.  It was started in 1974 in response to 
terrorist attacks on civilians.  The Civil Guard is a volunteer corps of civilians that was 
formed to assist Israeli police officials in administering internal security and, in 
particular, to help prevent residential terrorist attacks.  The corps is established at the 
community level and is centered on neighborhood headquarters that “dispatch foot 
patrols, man checkpoints, inspect bus stations and markets, engage in traffic control, and 
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carry out guarding duties at schools.”187  This is not a small “fringe” movement either.  
Today the Civil Guard includes over 70,000 volunteers.  In fact, it dwarfs the official 
police force.  In Tel Aviv, late in 2001, there were over 8,000 uniformed volunteers and 
just over 3,000 full-time police officers.188  These are civilian volunteers engaging in 
official security functions.  They assist the police in “providing security and maintaining 
public order, preventing crime, and tending to weaker and more vulnerable populations, 
as well as helping to deal with social problems that are the primary responsibility of the 
police.”189  Their services have proved invaluable by (1) providing a capable local 
presence to respond swiftly to terrorist attacks and (2) helping the police with routine 
tasks, thereby freeing them for higher priority security duties. 190  With this level of 
voluntary engagement, one can begin to see that Israeli citizens are greater assets than 
liabilities. 
c. Community Practices 
The most observable indicators of the Israeli “culture of preparedness” are 
the security practices that have become standard across Israeli communities.  In every 
neighborhood there is a protective pit designed for citizens to deposit suspicious packages 
that might be bombs.  Local hospitals maintain outdoor showers for use in the event of a 
chemical attack.  Up-to-date information about evacuation routes and shelters is well 
publicized through a robust civil defense program.  In settlements along the West Bank, 
the residents set up their own emergency response centers.  A supervisor of one such 
center claimed, “Bulletproof vehicles aren’t enough here.  You need people to respond.”  
Israeli citizens are well aware of the vital role their communities play in homeland 
security.191 
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d. Individual Preparedness 
Israeli preparedness is not just a community phenomenon.  Israeli citizens 
are under no illusion that the government or the community will provide all the security 
they need.  Individual responsibilities for self and family preparedness are taken seriously 
as well.  For example, each home built since the first Gulf War is required to have a 
hardened room that is able to function as a family shelter in case of attack.  One author 
provided this description of such a room: 
At a glance, the secure room in Uzi Landau’s modest apartment near Tel 
Aviv looks like a typical study.  A computer whirs quietly in one corner, 
and software manuals, spiritual texts, and books of political philosophy 
line the shelves.  But a closer look tells a different story.  A heavy steel 
plate is rolled over the window with a few tugs.  The windows and steel 
door have gaskets which seal the room against biological and chemical 
attack.  The walls, floor, and ceiling of the room are made of reinforced 
concrete.  And government-distributed gas masks sit beside a manual for 
Windows 98.192 
As was said in the beginning of this section, homeland security is not 
merely an idea to Israeli citizens, but an integral part of daily life—and it permeates 
society at the individual, community, and government levels. 
e. Motivation 
Given the prevalence of terrorism, it would be reasonable to assume that 
fear is a primary motivator for Israeli citizens to get involved in their own security.  
Obviously, fear is a factor that cannot be ignored because Israel, as a democratic society, 
is unique in that respect.  However, most visitors are quite surprised at just how “normal” 
life seems in this “terror-filled” environment.  In early 2002, Israel had just ended one of 
its worst-ever years of terrorism:  233 attacks, including 35 suicide events.193  It was near 
the peak of the Palestinian al-Aqsa intifada (“uprising”).  Yet one United States-born 
mother and seven-year resident of Jerusalem had this to say about her way of life in 
Israel: 
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I don’t think of my home as a war zone … If the Israel of news accounts 
seems an embattled country, visitors here are invariably struck by the 
persistence of normalcy—open businesses, bustling streets, children in 
schools, parks full of people.  
Yet beneath our adherence to routine lies a not-so-thinly-veiled anxiety, 
the result of terrorist attacks so frequent they themselves have come to 
seem almost routine. I can’t say that I walk around feeling uptight all the 
time, but when I’m in a public space—especially downtown Jerusalem—I 
am intensely aware of every passerby. Suicide bombers often perform 
their deadly missions in disguise, dressed as Orthodox Jews or Israeli 
soldiers. Any man or woman carrying a lot of packages is suspect. When I 
leave a public place, something in my body relaxes. Only then do I realize 
how tense I have been, how wary of the crowd.194 
It would seem the Israeli experience is better described by words like 
“anxiety” and “uneasiness” rather than “fear” or “terror.”  Preparedness and security are a 
way of life because terrorism is.  Both are almost considered routine.  From the woman’s 
comments, one gets the sense that the constant threat of terrorism naturally motivates the 
Israeli citizen to be watchful, alert, and wary when out in public, but not at home.  It is 
easy to see why this level of tension would create a strong incentive to learn about the 
threat, how to protect oneself and one’s family from it, and how to respond in the event 
of an attack.  It is not so clear, from a rational perspective, why it would motivate one to 
habitually put oneself at greater risk by taking a more active role to protect the 
community by providing security at a bus stop or joining the Citizen Guard.  Even with 
the constant threat of terrorism, the free rider problem still has the potential to prevent 
widespread citizen engagement, but it does not.  Thus, fear is not the only motivator for 
an Israeli citizen to get involved in her country’s security. 
It does seem likely that fear would motivate Israeli citizens to find their 
own ways to deal with the ever-present threat in their lives, but whether their ways would 
naturally contribute to the security of others in a significant way is doubtful.  The 
government plays an important role in designing and organizing programs that leverage 
individual participation in order to enhance the overall security of the nation. 
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2. Government Leverage 
The Israeli government has gone to great lengths to incorporate every societal 
entity into homeland security, just as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
seeks to engage its entire “enterprise.”  Unlike the United States, however, Israel has 
managed to rely on its citizens as the cornerstone of its homeland security efforts.  
Despite the multitude of counterterrorism measures it employs, the government 
understands “that savvy people—more than technology, or physical barriers, or special 
tactics—are the critical weapon they can wield against terrorists.”195  Indeed, 
participation of the public has proven to be vital:  civilians foil more than 80 percent of 
the terrorist attacks attempted.196  Much of this is owed to the hyper-alertness that the 
uneasiness of constant terrorism naturally produces.  However, nervousness alone does 
not create an informed public that is (1) willing to bear the risks of living a “normal” life; 
(2) willing or able to take rational and effective actions in the face of danger; and (3) 
willing to incur additional personal risk for the sake of others.  A well-reasoned and 
active approach on the part of the government has yielded these results. 
Israel pursues direct engagement of its citizens in three specific elements of its 
counterterrorism policy:  intelligence collection, chemical and biological attack defense, 
and efforts to strengthen the population’s psychological endurance.197  The government 
achieves their desired level of public participation through the combined use of (1) 
awareness, (2) education and training, (3) legal enforcement, and (4) incentives.   
a. Awareness 
Building and maintaining public awareness are critical to Israel’s 
counterterrorism efforts.  As proven by the record of foiled plots, civilian vigilance is a 
major component in preventing successful terrorist attacks.  Israel leverages its discerning 
public by exposing them to public service announcements that further assist them in 
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identifying suspicious objects, vehicles, and people and, most importantly, that instruct 
them on what to do should they encounter such anomalies.198  Government-sponsored 
television advisories remind people how to spot explosives in a public place.199  The 
police post public notices titled “We Can Only Stop Terrorism Together,” detailing how 
to identify a suicide bomber: 
He might be a young man (or woman) dressed inappropriately for the time 
of year—wearing a heavy jacket on a summer’s day in order to conceal 
explosives, for example—or he may be carrying a bag or suitcase that 
might contain a bomb.200   
The notice also suggests ways to recognize unusual behavior among terror suspects:  
“nervousness, fidgeting, sweating, and a tendency to avoid eye contact with security 
personnel.”  Other public displays provide specific instructions on how to respond to a 
terrorist attack:  leave the area, seek protection, and stay clear of tall buildings, glass 
windows, and motor vehicles.201  The government makes sure Israeli citizens are 
constantly exposed to threat information and appropriate responses to it.  Its open sharing 
of information fosters trust and facilitates a partnership with the public.  That trust and 
partnership are reflected in the public’s willingness to report suspicious items or activities 
to the police, as well as in its willingness to work alongside the police in volunteer 
capacities. 
b. Education and Training 
Israel realizes that awareness is important, but not enough to achieve the 
coordinated behavior needed to prevent and effectively respond to terrorism.  Education 
and training are used for this purpose.  For the most part, they are not optional.  For 
school-age children, education serves two purposes:  (1) to create the desired behavior 
and (2) to instill a culture of security.  As children get older, education turns more toward 
training when high school adolescents gain practical experience as volunteers.  Directly 
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following high school, three years of mandatory service in the army acts as the capstone 
to their school experience and then the transformation is complete.  Israeli adults 
routinely rely on their military experience later in their private lives.  Security-
mindedness is ingrained; most citizens have acquired the knowledge and skills to 
recognize security threats, immediately notify appropriate authorities, as well as render 
assistance following terrorist attacks.  Education and training are the foundation of Israeli 
citizen preparedness. 
c. Legal Enforcement 
Even with a strong security-minded culture, Israel employs legal 
mechanisms to achieve desired counterterrorism objectives.  In this case, mandatory 
requirements are established not mainly for the purpose of compelling compliance, but in 
order to ensure standardization.  Standardization helps to create order out of the chaos of 
terrorism.  If all newer homes (since 1992) are required to have hardened, sealable safe 
rooms, not only do responders know exactly where to find residents following a chemical 
attack, they also know that their first priority is getting to the older homes without the 
rooms.  Because the safe rooms must meet legal standards, responders are able to make 
reasonable assumptions about the safety of the occupants in newer homes.  The result is a 
more efficient response and one that has the potential to save more (and risk fewer) lives.  
Even if the government required “safe rooms” but did not specify their design, 
emergency response would be no more efficient or effective than without the rooms, 
because no assumptions could be made.  Legal enforcement has the effect of minimizing 
confusion in crises by achieving some level of predictability in what would otherwise be 
pandemonium.  Because adequate levels of trust, cooperation, and like-mindedness exist 
between the government and its citizens, legal enforcement of homeland security 
requirements is not met with the same resentment or resistance as it might be elsewhere, 
such as in the United States. 
d. Incentives 
Although the government does not seem to rely a great deal on incentives 
as part of their program, incentives still exist for individuals to increase their involvement 
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in homeland security.  In this case, incentives are not economic, or very often even 
tangible.  Incentives are primarily social and are found in such things as the satisfaction 
of working as a nation, or the recognition and status of being an official member of an 
Israeli security organization, such as the Civil Guard.  These types of incentives are 
achieved by designating responsibilities and providing volunteer opportunities as low as 
the neighborhood and public school levels. 
Make no mistake:  the Israeli system is not without its problems.  Although the 
model is an excellent example of how a government can design methods to leverage its 
citizenry, Israel will never achieve 100 percent participation.  In several cases, citizens 
have had the chance to assist in thwarting attacks, but have not, and it has been costly.  
Many such cases have involved minority Israeli Arabs who decided not to report 
information to the police because they feared being harmed if seen approaching from the 
sight of a terrorist attack, or they felt they needed to be 100 percent certain that their 
suspicions were correct before reporting.202  In one case, an Arab student was warned by 
the suicide bomber on her bus to get off before the impending explosion.  She and her 
friend got off the bus, but did not report the possible crime.  Nine people were killed and 
dozens were injured in the attack.  The girl’s father defended her, explaining that she 
could not be certain of the man’s intentions.203  However, this does not mean that Israel 
has a problem enlisting the help of willing Arab citizens in the fight against terrorism.  
There are 7,000 Arab volunteer members of the Civil Guard—ten percent of the entire 
corps.204  No system is flawless, but Israel’s is about as close as one might get in terms of 
collaborating with the public in homeland security endeavors, especially within a 
democratic society. 
3. A Viable Framework for the United States? 
At first glance, it might seem difficult to incorporate lessons from Israel into the 
American homeland security system because the countries are just so different from each 
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other.  While both are considered liberal democracies, each country’s citizens have very 
different levels of tolerance for government involvement in their personal lives.  What 
Israelis would consider routine practices, Americans would consider invasive, alarmist, 
or even “fear-mongering:”  performing frequent trunk inspections, stationing armed 
guards and metal detectors at shopping malls, and providing infant gas masks along with 
the formula and diapers as newborns leave the hospital.205  Much of this difference is 
attributed to the other differences.  Israel, in contrast to the United States, has an acute 
and persistent terrorist threat, is surrounded by adversaries on every side, and has a 
population and land area fractions the size of the United States.  These differences are 
significant and prevent direct application of Israel’s specific practices.  However, Israel’s 
basic framework for achieving citizen engagement still offers much to learn, which can 
be applied. 
It is unlikely that the American public would be receptive to a massive corps of 
uniformed police volunteers or gas mask training for their first graders.  What we can 
learn from Israel’s prevalent civilian preparedness is not so much the substantive, or 
specific, security measures they employ, but the mechanisms used to garner the attention 
and support of the population.  Israel has one distinct advantage in engaging its citizens 
that the United States may never have:  the persistent, credible threat of terrorism that has 
had a significant effect in most citizens’ lives … repeatedly.  This perception of a real 
threat that is likely to have a very personal impact acts as a negative incentive to increase 
an individual’s likelihood of taking appropriate preparedness actions.  Furthermore, 
individuals have seen that the large group of individuals with a common interest in 
protection from terrorism will not always be able to protect them, so many of the actions 
they take are perceived to provide a noncollective benefit, one they cannot get from the 
group.  Therefore, the government has had little problem enlisting direct public support in 
countering terrorism.   
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However, this perception of the threat does not necessarily explain why citizens 
would take additional steps to that would put them in harm’s way for the sake of 
strangers.  Yet they do.  There is still an incentive for individuals to free ride by taking 
care of themselves, their families, and perhaps their close friends while leaving the rest of 
population for “the group” to take care of.  Furthermore, the persistent threat does not 
necessarily provide an incentive to conform one’s security practices to the rest of 
society’s for the sake of the group.  Even with a common interest to protect one’s fellow 
citizens from the effects of terrorism, there still exists a rational, self-interested tendency 
for individuals to maximize their own utility at the expense of the group.  Israel 
overcomes this tendency, whether knowingly or unknowingly, by employing the 
mechanisms previously discussed. 
a. Incentives 
From this research, Israel does not appear to have an overt incentive 
structure to entice individuals to contribute to its security.  Rather, it is able to rely on the 
terrorist threat to provide incentive and then supplements with other mechanisms.  
However, whether intentional or not, there are still incentives present within its 
framework, almost entirely of a social nature.   
(1.) Youth Education and Training. Some might regard the 
youth education measures as coercive, but there are distinct social incentives inherent in 
them as well.  At younger ages, there are positive incentives to do well in school 
endeavors, to be the best among peers, or to receive praise from teachers and parents.  
There may also be negative incentives associated with nonparticipation or lack of 
performance in the form of discipline, ridicule, or even corporal punishment, if used.  
However, at the elementary ages, directed behaviors would usually be considered 
voluntary until a child is openly defiant, belligerent, or unyielding.  Incentives to perform 
the directed actions are typically effective enough at younger ages to preclude using more 
coercive means.  Furthermore, school-age education and training capitalizes on a 
particularly receptive segment of the population that has not yet developed mindsets or 
habits that are difficult to overcome.  An additional incentive is provided for parents to 
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get more involved as well, when their children are being taught relevant new skills that 
can be applied at home.  In Israel, parents also provide their children an incentive to 
develop a security mindset by occasionally providing security at their schools, illustrating 
that some of the concepts and skills they are learning are actually applicable to their lives 
as adults. 
The United States has begun to recognize the potential to 
encourage greater citizen participation by directing educational incentives to the younger 
population.  The most recent Citizen Preparedness Review provided a useful literature 
review of worldwide youth preparedness efforts at the individual, school, and community 
levels.206  Analysis of the literature led the writers to conclude that schools are an ideal 
place for children to learn preparedness skills, that youth education offers the benefit of 
continual reinforcement, and that youth education provides an opportunity for parents to 
get involved.207 
(2.) Volunteer Opportunities. Voluntarism provides significant 
social incentives for Israeli citizens to get involved in their country’s security.  Israel has 
achieved a remarkable level of participation in its all-volunteer Civil Guard and this 
would not be possible without such incentives.  With the prevalent civilian involvement 
in this organization, it is very likely that most Israelis are well acquainted or even close 
friends with a member of the corps.  The wider the participation, the more likely social 
incentives like prestige and social pressure are to exist because members of the larger 
group become aware of others’ contributions, or lack thereof.  Furthermore, most of the 
volunteer opportunities are centered on smaller groups, even down to the neighborhood 
level, further increasing the visibility of others’ contributions to the group’s collective 
good of security. 
The United States has established several volunteer agencies, but 
they have not yet achieved a level of participation proportionate to the Israeli level.  
Thus, they are not yet a significant source of social incentives for most Americans.  
These volunteer opportunities are primarily centered at the community level, which may 
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not provide the needed visibility of individual contributions to the larger group in order to 
encourage greater involvement.  With the current structure of volunteer organizations, 
USAonWatch-Neighborhood Watch might have the greatest potential to do this based on 
the smaller size of its neighborhood-based groups. 
(3.) Community Practices. Reminders of the threat and of 
citizen security responsibilities are so prevalent at the community level that there likely 
exist social pressures for citizens to understand and execute their roles even within this 
larger group.  It might be quite embarrassing to pass countless instructional signs, 
neighbor “bomb” pits, chemical showers, and other security measures and indicators and 
be caught not understanding their intended purpose or proper use.  There are similar 
social incentives in the United States to not be “made the fool” by revealing ignorance of 
traffic laws while driving in heavy traffic or being ridiculed for acting in a socially 
irresponsible way by tossing an empty drink in the middle of a crowded sidewalk.  Even 
in a large group of strangers, there are social incentives for acting in a group-oriented 
way when individual actions or inactions are noticeable to other members of that group.  
This might be one way to use social incentives at the community level in the United 
States.  Prevalent warnings, instructions, or “in case of …” advisories appropriate for the 
local threats might create local environments in which it is socially unacceptable to be 
ignorant of these measures. 
While Israel may not use a structured incentive program, it still 
leverages social incentives to achieve an optimum level of citizen engagement and help 
defeat tendencies to free ride.  In the absence of a persistent, credible threat and an 
established “culture” of preparedness to incentivize individuals, the United States might 
expect better results from an intentional, targeted economic incentive program similar to 
the ones used to achieve widespread citizen participation in “go green” efforts.  The 
government has emplaced countless creative measures to incentivize individuals to act in 
environmentally responsible ways, including tax breaks, insurance discounts, and rebates 
and refunds for living in environmentally friendly houses, driving environmentally 
friendly vehicles, and disposing of recyclables and hazardous materials in 
environmentally friendly ways.  Is homeland security any less important?  Furthermore, 
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incentives have been able to rapidly achieve desired individual behaviors, on a voluntary 
basis, and without requiring a corresponding change in individual beliefs.  Instead of 
waiting patiently for citizen engagement to emerge as part of a pervasive shift in 
“cultural” beliefs about homeland security, incentives can be used to nudge citizens into 
the desired behaviors now, and the culture may eventually follow. 
b. Coercion 
Coercive mechanisms are a prominent component of Israel’s framework 
for achieving widespread individual behaviors for the sake of its collective security.  
While social incentives are mostly effective in youth education, one would expect that, 
when those incentives fail, coercion be used to the extent that society allows.  This 
research did not reveal the level of coercion that Israel’s public school system relies 
upon.  In the United States, detentions and suspensions of students for repeated 
noncompliance would be mechanisms normally thought of as coercive.  The fact that 
students are required to attend school is a coercive instrument.  Once homeland security 
education and training were made part of the state-approved curricula, some level of 
coercion would be available in the public school systems for garnering citizen 
participation, and particularly for leveraging the younger population, where a desired 
culture is more likely to be sown.  
Compulsory military service is arguably the greatest coercive contributor 
to homeland security for Israel.  The knowledge and skills instilled through military 
training become almost second nature and are no doubt invaluable to everyday security 
preparedness once military service is complete.  The application of this particular element 
to the United States framework seems entirely unlikely.  The United States is not going to 
reinstitute the draft any time soon, and certainly not for the sake of achieving greater 
civilian preparedness.  However, a similar notion of coercive training could be used while 
individuals are still subject to the public school system.  Military-type training would not 
likely be socially acceptable or even necessary, but compulsory emergency response 
training might have a place in the United States for 17- and 18-year-olds in high school—
especially if such training could be “eased into” the public school curricula.  Citizen 
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Corps programs could be leveraged by requiring students to spend a week or two with 
one of its partner agencies such as going through CERT training, or being exposed to the 
Fire Corps, VIPS, or even the MRC. 
Israel also uses coercion to achieve standardization.  The most obvious 
example from this research is the mandatory “safe rooms” built to specifications in every 
new home.  Coercion is the only effective mechanism for this purpose.  The goal of 
standardization in this case is to achieve predictability in the midst of chaos.  “Partial” 
standardization that might be obtained through incentives would not meet this goal.  
Where standardization is deemed critical to saving lives (or even to saving critical 
resources), the United States should incorporate coercive devices in order to get it.  If 
beachfront homes along the Gulf Coast could be built in such a way to double their 
chances of withstanding a Category 3 hurricane, state governments could write these 
methods into building codes for vulnerable locations.  Homeowners would foot the bill 
for more durable design, but by doing so might save the country millions of dollars in the 
long run.  For areas that were assessed to be less critical, incentives could be offered for 
homeowners to build “disaster-resistant” homes.  Actually, such a program is already 
under way.  The recently established Resilient Home Program is intended to be analogous 
to existing environmental home-building programs such as Energy Star.  Its goal, 
however, is “to develop and market a cost-effective national or regional (southeastern 
United States) certification program to ensure higher performance of buildings during 
natural disasters.”208  Findings from the study will be used to develop certification 
standards that can then either be incentivized or enforced in particular regions. 
Coercion is a mainstay in the Israeli framework because so many citizen 
actions are critical to national resilience and even survival.  The continuous terrorist 
threat demands that many behaviors be enforced.  The prevalent threat is also the reason 
coercion is more acceptable to Israeli citizens.  The level of national threat requires that 
some civil liberties be sacrificed for the sake of survival.  In the United States, where 
                                                 
208 Community & Regional Resilience Institute, "Creating Resilient Communities: The Work of 
SERRI and CARRI" (information package, Oak Ridge National Laboratory), 10, http://www.resilientus 
.org/library/SERRI_CARRI_Information_Package_92109_1253565206.pdf (accessed December 1, 2010). 
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threats are not jeopardizing national security or survival to the same degree, coercion is 
less acceptable to the public and less necessary for security and resilience.  In the case of 
vital interests, however, coercion is a necessary tool. 
c. “Federation” 
In addition to social incentives and coercive instruments, Israel also 
leverages Olson’s principle of smaller “federal” groups to reduce the incentive for its 
citizens to free ride.  Its primary mechanism for doing so is the Citizen Guard, which is 
organized around neighborhood headquarters.  Neighborhood-based groups increase the 
likelihood that outstanding contributions, as well as nonparticipation, are noticed by 
members of the group, creating social incentives to contribute to the group’s common 
interests.  If the United States were able to establish a neighborhood-level focus with its 
Citizen Corps councils, or leverage economic incentives to increase participation in the 
existing Neighborhood Watch program, the likelihood of achieving social incentives 
would increase as well.  It may even create enough marginal utility for some individuals 
to decide to bear additional costs in order to make up for free riding members of the 
group.  Israel also employs the concept of federating the large group interest by having 
parents assist with security details at the public schools.  An analogous concept for the 
United States might be to find ways for parents to participate occasionally in emergency 
drills at their children’s schools.  Achieving visibility of individual actions is key to 
establishing social incentives.  “Federal” groups are one method for accomplishing this 
even with large groups. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The United States recently unveiled a groundbreaking approach to national 
security.  In the 2010 National Security Strategy, the Obama administration recognized a 
blurring distinction between national security and homeland security.  In so doing, the 
new strategy not only acknowledged the importance of individual citizens to the 
collective national effort, but also, for the first time, named specific areas in which 
individual contributions would be vital.  The Department of Homeland Security has 
embraced the strategy, at least on paper, and, appropriately, has identified roles intended 
specifically for individuals in four of its five core missions.  More remarkably, the 
department has declared the “highest calling” of the homeland security enterprise is to 
empower Americans to contribute directly to the nation’s security.209  Homeland security 
experts outside of government have echoed this rhetoric, claiming that the government, in 
fact, has taken too long to adopt such an approach. 
Even so, it is difficult to imagine national leaders saying anything less inspiring to 
its citizens, regardless of the real value that individual Americans add to the homeland 
security effort.  The rhetoric itself does not prove their importance.  However, a survey of 
past homeland security incidents have shown that individuals, indeed, are critical.  In 
larger attacks and disasters, the efforts of private citizens may not always be decisive, but 
they will always have the potential to save lives.  The passengers of United Flight 93 are 
just one example.  Americans have displayed their potential to endure disasters and 
tragedies, to selflessly serve suffering victims, to foil terrorist attacks, and to work 
together to solve problems without waiting for prompting from officials.  Likewise, 
Americans have shown the importance of their participation when they have failed to 
provide it, such as by neglecting to prepare for emergencies, as exhibited in the attacks of 
9/11 and in Hurricane Katrina.  Direct engagement of individuals in homeland security 
missions is essential. 
                                                 
209 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 69. 
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However, individuals have the potential to affect homeland security in ways that 
are not directly observable—ways that are often overlooked by officials.  In short, they 
can not only contribute to homeland security, but also have the potential to energize the 
entire enterprise.  Citizens engaged in homeland security can shape local policy by 
directly participating in its formulation, much the way citizen advisory councils guided 
urban renewal programs in the 1960s and 1970s.  Beyond direct participation, informed 
citizens engaged in homeland security have the potential to strengthen all levels of 
homeland security policy through their elected representatives and through elections of 
those representatives.  Therefore, the homeland security enterprise should contribute 
to creating a politically informed, engaged citizenry by increasing awareness of 
policies, potential policies, and their impacts on citizens at the individual level.  As 
business leaders and employees, engaged individuals also have the potential to exert 
significant influence on the private sector to adopt better homeland security practices.  
Individual Americans’ greatest influence, however, is likely to be on other individuals, 
especially those close to them.  Individual citizens have the unique capacity to invigorate 
the entire homeland security enterprise, but only if they are active within it. 
Research, however, reveals that American citizens are not active.  Their potential 
to strengthen homeland security remains latent due to extensive nonparticipation, most 
notably when it comes to personal preparedness for “all hazards.”  The tragedies of 9/11 
and Hurricane Katrina have done nothing to motivate Americans to act, and despite over 
seven years of aggressive awareness campaigns, community-based education and 
training, and countless volunteer opportunities, individuals have hardly moved.  The lack 
of results suggests a new approach is needed, one that reconsiders the root cause of the 
population’s immobilization.  The federal government’s focus on changing individual 
beliefs about the personal nature of homeland security threats is well intentioned, but 
ineffective.  When 91 percent of Americans recognize the importance of preparing for 
emergencies, but only 58 percent have done anything about it, lack of awareness does not 
appear to be the problem.210  Officials have acknowledged that the desired culture will 
take time and, indeed, already has.  Meanwhile, they have also assessed that the citizenry 
                                                 
210 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Weather Channel.” 
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is stagnantly falling far short of what is required “to ensure a more resilient nation.”211  It 
follows, then, that continuing to wait for Americans to respond to the current efforts to 
personalize the threat—thereby motivating them to take action—may prove costly.  We 
must find a way to achieve decisive results more quickly.  The homeland security 
enterprise must refocus immediate efforts from instilling “a culture” eventually to 
achieving the necessary individual behaviors now.  This will require framing the 
problem differently. 
By applying the theory of collective action, as developed by Mancur Olson in 
1965, we are able to analyze the problem citizen nonparticipation in a new way.  Using 
Olson’s theory as a framework, we assume the vast majority of American citizens (1) to 
be rational, self-interested individuals seeking to maximize their utility, or perceived 
benefits, and (2) to perceive that a personal benefit, or utility, is gained from homeland 
security.  These assumptions allow us to identify a very large group of individuals 
(approximately 90 percent of Americans) defined by a common interest in homeland 
security.  Olson’s theory explains that such a group will be immobilized by each 
individual’s incentive to free ride by allowing the group to provide the collective good 
(homeland security) without bearing any of the cost of providing it.  Furthermore, this 
behavior is completely rational since any contribution made by the individual would be 
imperceptible to the group.  Olson shows that such a large group can only be mobilized 
when a “separate and selective incentive” is used to stimulate individuals to act in a 
group-oriented way.212  Such stimulation can be achieved through positive or negative 
incentives, through coercion, or by “federating” the large group into smaller groups and 
thereby creating social incentives and pressures for individuals to contribute to the group.  
While awareness will remain important, these mechanisms will “nudge” individuals to 
take action where “awareness” will not. 
Olson’s theory of collective action, therefore, gives us three general solutions for 
mobilizing individuals to contribute to homeland security efforts:  (1) incentives, (2) 
coercion, and (3) “federation.”  Incentives are the most practical and politically palatable 
                                                 
211 U.S. President, “National Preparedness Month, 2009, Proclamation 8412,” 46663. 
212 Olson, Logic of Collective Action, 51. 
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approach of the three, though not appropriate for every case.  All three of these 
mechanisms have been successfully employed to engage Israeli citizens in their country’s 
security, where, despite a prevalent terrorist threat, there still exists an incentive to free 
ride.  Although most specific Israeli security practices are inapplicable to the United 
States based on vast differences between the two countries, the basic framework remains 
relevant and useful because it is based on human nature, rather than threats, 
demographics, geography, regional politics, or national culture.  The collective action 
framework and its general solutions show promise in eliciting immediate widespread 
behavior changes while waiting for the elusive “culture of preparedness” to emerge 
among American citizens.  In order to swiftly achieve the desired level of citizen 
participation in homeland security, the homeland security enterprise must adopt a 
new strategy:  overcome the free rider problem through the intentional and targeted 
use of (1) incentives, (2) coercion, and (3) “federal” groups. 
Incentives should target identified deficiencies in terms of both demographics 
and specific deficient behaviors.  Unless a group is sufficiently small (sub-neighborhood 
level) or the “cultural” objective has been achieved, social incentives should not be 
expected to work as well as economic incentives.  Economic incentives, on the other 
hand, will prove useful for any size group, as long as (1) the perceived personal gains 
from the incentive are separate from the personal gains provided by the group-oriented 
behavior itself; and (2) the incentive selectively rewards only those who contribute to the 
group objective (or punishes those who do not).  Incentives can be tied—or linked—to 
currently existing programs, such as “go green” initiatives.  They can also be combined 
with commonplace activities, such as renewing vehicle registration, buying a house, 
leasing an apartment, or shopping.  Finally, incentives can be employed at any level of 
the enterprise and, for that matter, will be increase in effectiveness as they increase in 
prevalence.  Therefore, the federal government should support and guide the use of 
incentives by all levels of government and by the private sector.  In cases where security 
depends upon the widespread deliberate actions of individuals, coercion (legal 
enforcement) should be used to achieve the particular behavior.  Where possible, the 
attempt should be made to “federate” large groups of individual Americans into very 
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small groups in order to reap the benefits of (1) social incentives and (2) individuals 
willing to bear the entire cost of providing the collective good for the group. 
The United States’ collective strength hinges on the participation of its citizens.  
However, we have no reliable reason to expect individual contributions toward homeland 
security goals without the proper mechanisms and institutions in place.  Without 
“separate and selective” incentives to get citizens engaged, we will continue to measure 
the strength of the country in terms of potential, at the expense of national security and, 
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